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INTRODUCTION
This article continues our analysis of the activities of the two
principal human rights organs of the Organization of American
States ("OAS"): the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("the
Court"), and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ("the
Commission").' Almost all of the information contained in this
I. See Richard J. Wilson & Jan Perlin, The Inter-American Human Rights
System: Activities During 1999 through October 2000, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
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article comes from the published annual reports of the Commission
and the Court for the relevant periods, plus additional posted
information on published reports and decisions found on the websites
for both entities. As in our previous coverage of the work of these
bodies, our intention is not to provide an exhaustive catalog of all
activity during the relevant time period. We will not, for example,
systematically examine the important decisions by the Commission
and Court to issue precautionary and provisional measures,
respectively, although those decisions take on increasing importance,
particularly after the decision of the International Court of Justice in
the LaGrand Case,2 in which the court held that its own provisional
measures, issued against the United States to prevent the execution
of a German national in Arizona, were binding. Nor will we, for
example, examine the important resolutions of the OAS in the area of
human rights. Our intent here is to provide readers, particularly non-
Spanish speaking human rights lawyers and general readers, with a
sense of the highlights and directions of the Commission and Court.
The single most significant system-wide development in 2001 and
2002 was the entry into force of the Inter-American Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with
Disabilities, which acquired more than enough ratifications for entry
into force on September 14, 2001.3
I. ACTIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
This section will first address the issues and cases arising from
Peru's attempted repudiation of the Convention and subsequent
reaffirmation of the Court's jurisdiction. It will then continue by
discussing the extensive body of work of the Court during the
315 (2001) (highlighting actions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and
the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights).
2. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, para. 109 (June 27),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm (last visited
Jan. 24, 2003).
3. Inter-American Convention On The Elimination Of All Forms Of
Discrimination Against Persons With Disabilities, June 7, 1999, available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga-res99/eresl608.htm (last visited Nov. 21,
2002).
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relevant time period in the following order: 1) decisions on the
merits (some of which reach conclusions on reparations in the same
decision), 2) advisory opinions, 3) separate decisions on reparations,
4) decisions on admissibility (preliminary objections), and 5) new
cases accepted by the Court but not yet decided at any stage. Because
the decisions range across a number of doctrinal areas of human
rights law, discussion of individual decisions is not in order of their
perceived importance but in the order in which the Court decided
them.
A. PERU'S RETURN TO THE SYSTEM AND DECISIONS DEALING
WITH PERU
On January 23, 2001, after former President Fujimori's flight to
Japan and the establishment of an interim government, Peru notified
the Court that it had repudiated, by legislative act, the prior notice of
withdrawal from its jurisdiction4 and reestablished its recognition of
the Court's competence. Peru's reaffirmation of its acceptance of the
Court's jurisdiction is also manifest in the collaborative approach it
has taken on pending cases. At the same time, the facts underlying
the cases provide insight into how the previous administration had
attempted to legitimize government actions by giving them the patina
of legality, all the while employing repression to maintain power.
1. Barrios Altos Case (Chum bipuma Aguirre y Otros vs. Per)
The facts set out in the merits judgment of the Barrios Altos Case5
refer to the assassination-style summary execution of fifteen persons
and the wounding of four others at a neighborhood fundraising party
in 1991. The assassins were an "elimination squad" of Peruvian
military intelligence operatives known as the "Grupo Colina."
Investigations showed the operation was planned as a reprisal against
the Shining Path group. The home the squad raided was a suspected
meeting place for Shining Path members or sympathizers. Peru
4. Wilson & Perlin, supra note 1, at 323-24.
5. Barrios Altos Case (Chumbipuma Aguirre y Otros v. Peru) Judgment of
May 14, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser C) No. 75 (2001), available at
http://wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/75-ing.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
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recognized its international responsibility and offered to initiate
friendly settlement negotiations in 2001.
The Court called for a hearing to explore Peru's request. At the
session, Peru expressed its desire to normalize relations with the
Court and to give priority to resolving pending cases. "The
government's strategy in the area of human rights," Peru's
representatives stated, "is based on recognizing responsibility, but
above all, by proposing integrated procedures for attending to the
victims based on three fundamental elements: the right to truth, the
right to justice and the right to obtain fair reparation. 6
The significance of this case lies in the Fujimori government's
elaborate ten-year effort to cover up the truth and promote impunity
prior to the new government accepting responsibility before the
Court. As early as one week after the Barrios Altos attack, Peruvian
senators had published information on the case and named an
investigative commission. The dissolution of the national congress
some months later and the enactment of additional legal barriers
frustrated attempts to complete the criminal investigation. The most
far-reaching of these measures were two amnesty decrees that,
together, operated to give blanket amnesty to security forces and
government officials for any alleged human rights violations,
regardless of whether official investigations were pending. Initially,
the amnesty had only included the members of the security forces
and civilians that were the subject of complaints, investigations,
procedures, sentences, or that were serving prison sentences for
human rights violations.7
Trial Judge Antonia Saquicuray found the amnesty provisions,
Law 26479, contrary to constitutional guarantees and international
obligations.8 She continued the investigation of the Barrios Altos
Case that she had initiated the same year the amnesty law was
passed, in 1995. While her judgment was on appeal, a subsequent
law attempted to remove the dispute from the judicial sphere
entirely. Law 26492 decreed that the amnesty law was not subject to
judicial review, and that the law itself was of immediate and
6. Barrios Altos Case, para. 35.
7. Id. para. 2(j).
8. Id. para. 2(k).
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obligatory application.9 This second decree also broadened the
previous amnesty to cover all members of the military, police, or
civilian government functionaries who might be the subject of
prosecution for human rights violations committed between 1980 and
1995, even if there had been no charges filed. An appeals court
affirmed the validity of the new decree and rejected Judge
Saquicaray's judgment.10 The national justice system abandoned the
Barrios Altos case until 2001, when Peru conceded the invalidity of
the amnesty laws and agreed to work toward the abolition of all
obstacles to the investigation, prosecution, and sanction of those
responsible for those violations of the right to life and physical
integrity.
The Court took the opportunity to announce a definitive position
on the right to accountability for serious human rights violations. In a
section titled, "The Incompatibility of Amnesty Laws with the
Convention," the Court declared the following:
This Court considers that all amnesty provisions, provisions on
prescription and the establishment of measures designed to eliminate
responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent the
investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human
rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
execution and forced disappearance, all of these violations prohibited
because they violate non-derogable rights recognized by international
human rights law.
II
Later in the judgment, the Court concluded:
Owing to the manifest incompatibility of self-amnesty laws and the
American Convention on Human Rights, the said laws lack legal effect
and may not continue to obstruct the investigation of the grounds on
which this case is based or the identification and punishment of those
responsible, nor can they have the same or a similar impact with regard to
other cases that have occurred in Peru, where the rights established in the
American Convention have been violated.t 2
9. Id. para. 2(m).
10. Id. para. 2(n).
11. Id. para. 41.
12. Barrios Altos Case, para. 44.
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INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM UPDATE
The Court thus concluded that these self-amnesties are violative of
the right to a simple and effective judicial remedy for human rights
violations, under Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on
Human Rights ("American Convention"). 3 The Court determined
that these rights are likewise implicated in the Convention
obligations under Articles 1(1) and 2, which commit the State to
respect the rights to a fair trial and a judicial remedy, and to take
appropriate measures to achieve those ends. Impunity, the Court
reasons, is anathema to the protection of these rights.
Nevertheless, this decision fails to disqualify the promulgation of
amnesties altogether. It implicitly leaves the door open to amnesties
designed to further purposes other than impunity, such as
reconciliation or political transition from a repressive regime to one
that promises respect for human rights in the future. However, the
limitation on self-amnesties remains, which requires that a successor
government with no relationship to the underlying human rights
violations must enact any potentially valid amnesty law. To date, the
Inter-American system has not reviewed an amnesty meeting these
limited conditions.
The implications of the Court's reasoning for Peru's transition
were made clear when, in a judgment interpreting the Barrios Altos
decision, 4 the Court explained that the incompatibility of Peru's
amnesty laws with the Convention constituted a finding of general
application, and not limited to the case at hand. The Court referred
the Commission, which had requested the interpretation, to the
portion of its judgment concluding that the amnesty laws lack
judicial effect because, by their very nature they deny the obligation
to enact legal measures to ensure the rights protected by the
Convention and to investigate and punish those responsible. The
Court reasoned that these amnesty laws have the general effect of
undermining the State's obligation to implement human rights treaty
13. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36,
1114 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention], available at
http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/teleam/global/ilo/law/oashr.htm (last visited Jan.
21, 2003).
14. Barrios Altos Case, Interpretation of the Judgment on the Merits (Art. 67
American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of Sept. 3, 2001, Inter-Am Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 83 (2001), available at
http://www l.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/83-ing.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
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commitments, as a matter of conventional and customary
international law.' 5
Once Peru assumed its responsibility for the violations of the right
to life, physical integrity, due process, and judicial remedy and
agreed to submit the case to its judgment, the Court rendered the
final decision. Reparations were left for a separate proceeding in
accordance with Court Rule 52(2).
The reparations decision 6 noted Peru's report that, in compliance
with the merits judgment, it had created a Truth Commission for the
purpose of clarifying the facts and corresponding responsibilities
underlying the human rights violations committed between May,
1980 and November, 2000. This decision also noted that Peru had
entered into an "Agreement on Integral Reparations for the Victims
and their Family in the case of Barrios Altos."17
The Court validated the Agreement, which provided for
substantial money damages ($175,000 for each victim, with one
survivor receiving $250,000)," 8 in addition to health, education, and
job training benefits for surviving relatives. A series of reparatory
measures were directed at dismantling the legal tools of impunity. To
that end the agreement commits Peru to implement the Court's order
on the "inefficacy" of the amnesty laws, to codify the crime of extra-
judicial execution, and to initiate the process of signature and
ratification of the International Convention on the Imprescriptability
of Crimes Against Humanity. Interestingly, neither the Court nor the
agreement call specifically for the repeal of the amnesty laws, which
implies that there is more than one available mechanism for
invalidating the effect of those laws, and that the choice is up to the
country itself on how it will achieve compliance.
Other reparatory measures included an order that the government
comply with the Court's determination that the amnesty laws are per
15. Id. paras. 16-17.
16. Barrios Altos Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1) American Convention on
Human Rights), Judgment of Nov. 30, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 87
(2001), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/87-ing.html (last
visited Nov. 30, 2002).
17. Id. paras. 10-11.
18. Throughout this article, all money amounts denote U.S. dollars.
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se violative of the Convention, the official publication of the Court's
judgment, a public and official apology, a request for a pardon from
the victims and their families, and a statement of the State's
determination to prevent such acts from being repeated in the future.
The Agreement also provided for the construction of a monument to
remember the victims.
Additional reparations cases from Peru, discussed below, include
measures similar to those provided for here. They reflect an effort to
socialize the values contained in the Court's decisions, and to give
some direct remedies to the victims that will affect their future well-
being. However, the reparations measures in other cases are not
nearly as far-reaching as those that rule inadmissible existing
national legislation, as in the case of Barrios Altos.
2. The Constitutional Court Case9
Like the Barrios Altos Case, the Constitutional Court Case
reflects the Fujimori government's practice of exercising arbitrary
power under the guise of legality. Alberto Fujimori was elected
president in 1990, after which he substantially "reformed" both
Congress and the courts. A new constitution adopted in 1993
contained a provision that would permit Fujimori's candidacy for a
second consecutive five-year presidential term beginning in 1995. In
1996, the Lima Bar Association filed suit before a newly named
seven-member Constitutional Court in which it challenged the
legitimacy of interpreting the new constitutional provisions to grant
Fujimori an additional term of office. This case arose from the
subsequent set of complex interactions and infighting between the
Constitutional Court, some of whose members acted to try to prevent
Fujimori's unilateral exercise of power and the Congress.
The Constitutional Court had drafted a majority decision, the
effect of which would have been to nullify the validity of a second
presidential term for Fujimori. Magistrates from that court fielded a
complaint before the legislature charging that one of their colleagues,
who disagreed with the decision, had improperly leaked the draft
19. Constitutional Court Case, Judgment of Jan. 31, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 71 (2001), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/71-
ing.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
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decision to the press. The complaining magistrates also documented
acts of intimidation from other sources. Two dissenting magistrates,
in turn, denounced in a letter to the legislature, irregularities in the
majority's decision-making process in the case. In a subsequent vote
on the matter, confusion reigned when some of the magistrates
recused themselves, others abstained, and the remaining three
magistrates, once again constituting a majority, reiterated their
decision to deny Fujimori a second presidential term. The legislature
ultimately dismissed these same three magistrates, and it is that
action which was challenged before the Court.
The dispute was played out in the legislature where a commission
originally designated to hear the complaint about the alleged leak,
ended up impugning the actions of the complaining judges. Without
providing any meaningful opportunity for a defense and exceeding
the powers it was originally granted to investigate, the congressional
commission levied charges against the three magistrates who had
voted to limit the executive's ability to maintain itself in power, and
summarily dismissed them.
On August 14, 2000, prior to considering the merits of the case,
the Inter-American Court ordered provisional measures in favor of
one of the judges, Delia Revoredo Marsano, and her family, who
suffered persecution, harassment, and threats related to her actions in
the matter. The Peruvian government failed to appear at the
evidentiary hearings or to offer any argument on the merits. The
Court made the final judgment public on January 31,2001. However,
nine days before the Court issued the judgment, the newly designated
Peruvian government notified the Court that its legislature had
overturned the legislative decree purporting to revoke the Court's
jurisdiction. The legislative decree charged the executive branch with
nullifying the decree's effects in order for Peru to fully re-establish
its adherence to the contentious jurisdiction of the Court.
The Inter-American Court, auguring its final decision, offered
some wisdom on what it characterized as a "political" trial:
Under a rule of law, the impeachment proceeding is a means of
controlling senior officials of both the Executive and other State organs
exercised by the Legislature. However, this control does not mean that the
organ being controlled - in this case the Constitutional Court - is
subordinate to the controlling organ - and the supervised entity - in this
case the Legislature; but rather that the intention of the latter is that an
660 [18:651
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organ that represents the people may examine and take decisions on the
actions of senior officials.
20
The Court found violations of Article 8 (fair trial) based on the
Peruvian legislature's arbitrary actions, including its lack of
impartiality, and the denial of the right to a defense for the judges.
The victims' right to a predetermined, competent, independent,
impartial tribunal free from external pressures was also violated
when some of the congresspersons who formed the investigative
commission that dismissed the magistrates had themselves petitioned
to uphold the law allowing Fujimori's reelection. The investigative
committee had also ignored the irregular actions of the dissenting
magistrates, initially denounced before the legislature by the
magistrates who were later removed.
The right to a defense was undermined when the legislature
exceeded its mandate without prior notice or authorization; when the
dismissed justices had not been permitted to confront and question
the witnesses on whose information the accusation was based; and
when they were initially given only forty-eight hours to respond to
the charges. That period of time was later extended for one week, but
it expired on the very same day that the charges were finalized.
Moreover, the Court found that the resolution dismissing the justices
was entirely unsubstantiated.
The Court also found a violation of Article 25 (judicial remedy),
and in so doing asserted that judicial recourse should be available to
defendants in political trials in order to guarantee due process
without undermining the political nature of the oversight powers the
Constitution conceded to the legislative branch.21 In this same vein,
the Court rejected the claim that Article 23 political rights were
violated.
The Court noted that Peru's congress had revoked the resolutions
dismissing the three justices on November 17, 2000 and awarded the
victims lost wages and costs. Claims for expenses associated with
one victim's flight to Costa Rica where she received political
20. Constitutional Court Case, para. 63.
21. Id. paras. 93-94.
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asylum, and business losses attributed to the harassment and
persecution suffered by her and her spouse were rejected.
3. Ivcher Bronstein Case22
Baruch Ivcher Bronstein was another victim of political
persecution of the Fujimori government. The Court found violations
of Articles 20 (right to nationality), 8 (fair trial), 25 (judicial
remedy), 12 (expression and thought), 21 (private property) and 1(1)
(respect and guarantee of rights). As the President and Director of a
private television station, and under his editorial authority, he aired
programs reporting complaints of torture and executions carried out
against members of the Military Intelligence Service ("MIS") and
implicating the then-advisor to the MIS, Vladimiro Montesinos, in
widespread corruption. One program aired the testimony of a former
member of the MIS forces who stated members of her own
institution had tortured her.
Peruvian authorities denied Mr. Ivcher, a naturalized Peruvian
citizen, his right to nationality when they declared his Peruvian
naturalization void. A Peruvian court denied his right to property
when, on the basis of his status as a foreigner, it subsequently
ordered that he be divested of his majority shares in a television
station where he served as President and Director. The Court pointed
out that the process followed for voiding the naturalization decree
conflicted with that prescribed by Peruvian law, was invoked by an
incompetent authority, and that the administrative and judicial
processes employed violated due process guarantees. The Court
declared the act voiding Mr. Ivcher's naturalization arbitrary, in
violation of Article 20(3) of the Convention.
Concerning Mr. Ivcher's property rights, the Court held that it
should not be limited to examining only the formal circumstances of
the expropriation, but that it should also consider the facts and
circumstances that in reality provoked the civil court judgment. The
Court relied on recent jurisprudence from the European Court of
Human Rights in pursuing this approach.
22. Ivcher Bronstein Case, Judgment of Feb. 6, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 74 (2001), available at http://wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/74-ing.html
(last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
[18:651
2003] INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM UPDATE 663
The Peruvian civil court applied the law prohibiting foreigners
from owning any communications media and divested him of his
majority ownership in the company. After examining the
circumstances surrounding the judicial declaration suspending his
right to hold controlling shares in the company and ordering the
election of a new board, the Court determined that it was the State's
intention to deprive the victim of his property rights as a shareholder,
albeit a minority one. The Court cited jurisprudence from the
International Court of Justice for the proposition that shareholder
rights can be distinguished from ownership rights in a company and
concluded that the civil court judgment had denied Mr. Ivcher his
right to property by denying him the opportunity to exercise his
shareholder rights to participate in board elections and receive
dividends.
The facts and circumstances surrounding these events also
substantiated the Court's conclusion that voiding the victim's
nationality was an indirect means of restricting Mr. Ivcher's right to
freedom of expression, as well as that of others who worked at the
station and did investigative reporting for the program
"Counterpoint," that aired the complaints of torture and other
wrongdoing. The Court found that interference with the station's
operations also affected the right of other Peruvians to receive
information in order to exercise their political options and participate
fully in a democratic society.
A legislative resolution prior to the issuance of the Court's
judgment reinstated the victim's nationality and resolved to award
Mr. Ivcher $20,000 for moral damages and $50,000 for costs and
expenses. The resolution further held that the State must facilitate the
conditions for him to recuperate, his losses, which include the use
and enjoyment of his rights as a majority shareholder in the media
company. The Court also referred resolution of damages for lost
dividends and earnings to the competent national authorities.
This reparations arrangement was the subject of yet another
judgment interpreting that order.13 The Court reiterated its
23. Ivcher Bronstein Case, Interpretation of the Judgment on the Merits (Art.
67 American Convention on Human Rights) Judgment of Sept. 4, 2001, Inter-Am
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 84 (2001), available at
http://www I .umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/84-ing.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
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determination that material damages should be awarded according to
Peruvian law on the subject, by means of petitions the victim filed
before the competent national authorities. The Court repeated its
assertion that its decision was clear and consistent as to Peru's
obligation to indemnify the material damages suffered by Mr. Ivcher
by providing him with the opportunity to recover "the use and
enjoyment of his rights as a majority shareholder ... as he was until
August 1, 1997. "24
4. Other Reparations Cases from Peru
In Cesti-Hurtado25 the victim had been arbitrarily detained and
held by order of the military courts under Peru's anti-terrorist laws.
Unlike the Ivcher Bronstein case, the Court did not find a violation
of the right to property. Nevertheless, the victim claimed damages
incurred for lost income from his family business, for which he was
the legal representative and general director. He asserted that due to
his arbitrary detention, he lost income in the amount of $6,000,000,
suffered resulting damages in the amount of $4,000,000, and losses
of other expenditures in an attempt to minimize the damage to his
business.
The Court again referred the determination of material damages to
the domestic legal system, and ordered fixed amounts to compensate
the victim and his family for moral damages, and costs and expenses
related to litigating this case in the domestic and international
jurisdictions. The Court explained that the nature of the reparations
sought required the expertise of specialized national institutions with
knowledge of mercantile and commercial law to determine an
appropriate award.
The reparations decision in Durand and Ugarte26 is based on an
out-of-court agreement between the parties that the Court later
24. Id. para. 20.
25. Cesti Hurtado Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1) American Convention on
Human Rights) Judgment of May 31, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 78
(2001), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/78-ing.html (last
visited Jan. 21, 2003); see also Wilson & Perlin, supra note 1, at 324-325
(discussing the decision on the merits).
26. Duran and Ugarte Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1) American Convention on
Human Rights) Judgment of Dec. 3, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 89
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confirmed. The agreement followed Peru's regime change, and
provided for a monetary award of $125,000 to the victims' families,
the provision of health benefits, psychological support, job training,
and a housing subsidy. In addition, the agreement committed the
government to publishing the merits judgment in the official
Peruvian digest of jurisprudence and to issue and publish an official
apology and commitment of non-repetition. Finally, as in all of the
reparations cases, the Court ordered that the State of Peru investigate
and sanction those responsible for the death of Nolberto Durand and
Gabriel Pablo Ugarte, and to make all necessary efforts to locate the
victims' remains and return them to their families for burial. This last
commitment repeats the decision of the Court on the merits, and is
significant because it arises out of a process of negotiation between
the parties.
Luis Cantoral Benavides was arbitrarily detained for nearly four
and one-half years, tortured, tried in violation of due process
guarantees, and sentenced under the authority of Peru's former anti-
terrorist laws. In the reparations decision bearing his name,27 the
Court alluded to the legislation granting pardons to prisoners unjustly
imprisoned and sentenced for treason or terrorist acts. The legislation
restricts relief to those whom the designated national commission,
"reasonably presumes had no links of any kind with terrorists, or
their activities or organizations ...28
As in other cases discussed below, the victim's family members
received compensation for material and moral damages they suffered
as a consequence of the documented violations. The only dispute as
to damages concerned the State's insistence that it could not fully
provide reparations for medical services and university education so
long as the victim resided abroad. After being released from prison,
the victim left Peru to live in Brazil, and two of his brothers left the
(2001), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/89-ing.html (last
visited Jan. 21, 2003).
27. Cantoral Benavides Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1) American Convention on
Human Rights) Judgment of Dec. 3, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 88
(2001), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/88-ing.html (last
visited Jan. 21, 2003).
28. Id. para. 75.
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country for Bolivia. The State argued that it was unable to pay for
medical and education costs in another country.
Nevertheless, the Court ordered a monetary award of $10,000 for
future medical expenses, justified by the testimony of psychological
experts, to the victim and his mother. The Court stated that the victim
could not be compelled to return to Peru in order to receive
reparations. The Court also reimbursed the family for the cost of
travel to visit Luis in jail during his incarceration, his medical costs
while in jail, and the cost of medical and psychological attention for
his mother and twin brother, both of whom were seriously affected
physically and emotionally by Luis' circumstances.
Citing the disintegration of the entire family as a consequence of
these violations, the profound effect on all of the family members
both collectively and individually, and the drastic alteration of Luis'
potential life plan and previous expectations, the Court awarded
$60,000 to Luis, $40,000 to his mother, and $20,000 to his twin
brother as compensation for non-material damages.
In other reparations, the Court reiterated its order that the State
investigate the facts underlying these human rights violations,
identify those responsible and sanction all of them appropriately,
noting that leaving those violations unpunished promotes impunity
and represents a failure of the State's obligation to guarantee the full
and free exercise of rights under the Convention. The power of the
Court to supervise compliance with its judgments raises the question
of how the Court will effectively determine whether sufficient efforts
have been made to identify human rights violators and sanction
them. Currently, the Court's reparations decisions demand concrete
results, and its monitoring of compliance with those judgments has
increased over time.
B. DECISIONS IN OTHER CONTENTIOUS CASES ON THE MERITS
Traditionally, the Court considered contentious cases in three
procedural stages: admissibility (called preliminary objections by the
Court), merits, and reparations. At each procedural stage, the parties
submitted written pleadings and made oral arguments. As a result of
[18:651666
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changes to their Rules of Procedure in 2000,29 the Court now permits
full participation of both the Commission and the victims'
representatives in all stages of the proceedings, although victims still
do not have standing to take a case to the Court; only the
Commission or states may take such action. The decisions below are
those contentious cases that survived decisions on admissibility and
resulted in a judgment by the Court. In a new procedural
development, the Court sometimes decided both the merits and
reparations in a single decision, thus obviating the traditional third
procedural step. Those decisions are noted here, while traditional,
third-stage reparations decisions are discussed below in Section D.
1. Bamaca-Velasquez Case30 (Merits and Reparations)
This case involved a guerrilla combatant, captured during battle,
tortured, and then murdered by the military. The search for Efrain
Bdmaca involved Guatemala's judiciary, their Human Rights
Ombudsman's Office, the Guatemalan Historical Clarification
Commission ("Truth Commission"), the United Nations Human
Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala, all three branches of the
United States government, and the Inter-American human rights
system, not to mention the efforts of non-governmental
organizations, the press, and independent film-makers. This case
provoked an international response before the Court issued its
judgment in November 2000, even though his remains have never
been found.
The attention was due to the efforts to find him after his capture by
his widow, Jennifer Harbury, a Texas attorney who had met Efrain
Bdmaca while he was living clandestinely in the Guatemalan
countryside. The pressure she exercised on the U.S. government led
to the exposure of CIA practices that used known human rights
violators, suspected of being complicit in the death of U.S. citizens,
as paid informants. Her efforts generated a congressional intelligence
oversight board investigation of CIA information-gathering
29. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-Am. C.H.R., available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic 16.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
30. Bamaca Velasquez Case, Judgment of Nov. 25, 2000, Inter-Am Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 70 (2000), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/70-
ing.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
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practices. She fought for and achieved the declassification of official
U.S. government documents, as well as an acknowledgment by the
U.S. government that it knew Bdmaca had been held in captivity for
a time before being executed. That perseverance also led to the
civilian authorities' first inspection of all the military installations in
Guatemala. The civilian authorities carried out the inspections in a
single day in 1994 without prior official notice, primarily as a
symbolic gesture in the search for her missing husband.
This case was one of a number of cases in which Guatemala
recognized its international responsibility.3' As it turns out, the
government limited its statement to a general understanding that the
government hoped to reach friendly settlements. However, that
recognition did not include the concession of the facts as alleged by
the Commission. The government seemed to prefer to let the
Guatemalan national courts establish the historical truth, despite the
fact that the national courts had been manifestly ineffective for the
previous seven years during which domestic proceedings had been
pending, and the eight years since his disappearance. This argument
is akin to that of the former Minister of Defense who, in 1995,
declined to allow the State prosecutor access to an army barracks to
conduct an exhumation pursuant to credible information that Bdmaca
was buried there, asserting that jurisdiction had been transferred to
the Truth Commission.32
The Court proceeded to hear the merits of the case because of the
continuing existence of a factual dispute. The Commission alleged
that the victim was captured during a battle between guerrilla forces
and the Guatemalan military, in March 1992, and that he was held in
captivity, tortured, and eventually killed. The record as a whole
presents a chilling and detailed account of the counter-insurgency
tactics the Guatemalan military used, including the use of violence
and intimidation to frustrate judicial investigations and judgments.
Both the Recuperation of Historical Memory Report of the
Archbishop's human rights office and that of the Guatemalan Truth
31. See Wilson & Perlin, supra note 1, at 341-42 (describing the decision of the
Guatemalan government to accept responsibility in a number of cases, then
pending before the Commission).
32. Bamaca Velasquez Case, para. 88.
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Commission, issued in 1998 and 1999, respectively, corroborate the
testimony, and it is admitted to the record.
In resolution of the factual dispute, where the State essentially
argued that the practice of using captured guerrilla members as
intelligence sources was entirely voluntary, and that the existence of
prisoners of war was an exceptional circumstance unique to this
case, 33 the Court found, on both circumstantial and direct evidence,
that the Guatemalan military had systematically engaged in a
practice of forced disappearances of members of the guerrilla forces
by, "detaining them clandestinely without advising the competent,
independent and impartial judicial authority, physically and mentally
torturing them in order to obtain information and, eventually, killing
them. '34 Given the fact that the military clandestinely held Bdmaca
for at least four months after his capture and prior to his death, the
Court also found a violation of Article 7(2) (illegal detention as a
violation of personal liberty).35
Rebutting the State's factual assertions again, the Court found that
both Bdmaca and his family members were victims of violations of
the right to humane treatment. The State had argued that Bdmaca did
not have a close relationship with his family members due to the
nearly seventeen years that he was separated from his family before
his death. The Court rejected that assertion and accepted the
Commission's explanations that Bdmaca's absence was entirely due
to considerations for his family's safety, who would have been
targeted because of his involvement with the guerrillas had he
communicated with them. In its analysis, the Court points to the
novelty of direct testimonial evidence concerning the treatment of a
disappeared person while in captivity, and found Article 5(2)
(torture) and Article 5(1) (right to respect for physical, mental and
moral integrity) violations against his family members, as victims in
their own right.
The test for finding inhumane treatment with regard to next of kin
is based on recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
33. See id. para 125 (noting that the State argued that if Bdmaca Velasquez
was, in effect, a prisoner of war, it was an exception and not common practice).
34. Id. para. 132.
35. Id. paras. 143-44.
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Rights formulated in two cases against Turkey.36 It requires an
analysis of the intimacy of the family relationship generally, and
between individual family members and the victim. It should also
analyze the degree to which the family member witnessed the facts
around the disappearance, the family member's involvement in
attempts to obtain information about the fate of their relative, and the
State response to those efforts.37 Making special mention of the
efforts Jennifer Harbury expended to find her husband, the consistent
obstacles the State created, and the anguish the ignorance of his
whereabouts generated, the Court found that both she, Bdtmaca's
father, and his siblings were victims of an Article 5 violation.38
The Court also found violations of the right to life, to a fair trial,
judicial protection, and of Articles 1, 2, 6, and 8 of the Inter-
American Convention To Prevent and Punish Torture.39 It rejected a
claim under Article 3 (right to juridical personality), noting the
absence in the 1994 Inter-American Convention on Forced
Disappearance of Persons40 of any reference to juridical personality
as a characteristic of that violation. The Court did not deem it to be
an element of the right to life either. The right to truth was deemed to
be subsumed in the right to "obtain clarification of the facts relating
to the violations and corresponding responsibilities from the
competent State organs, through the investigation and prosecution
established in Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention.'
Finally, the Court once again took up the issue of the applicability
of international humanitarian law norms and treaties to its decisions.
Both the State and the Commission agreed that the Court could use
the Geneva Conventions, and the provisions of Common Article 3, to
36. Timurtas v. Turkey, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/Hudoc2doc2/HEJUD/200207/timurtas.batj.doc (last
visited Feb. 9, 2003); see also (akici v. Turkey, para. 98, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/Hudoc2doc2/HEJUD/200105/cakici%20%20batj%20-
%2023657jv.gc%20080799e.doc (last visited Feb. 9, 2003).
37. Bamaca Velasquez Case, para. 163.
38. Id. paras. 165-66.
39. Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985,
OAS Treaty Series No. 67, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 519 (1986).
40. Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, June 9,
1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1529 (1994).
41. Id. para. 201.
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interpret obligations under the American Convention. The
Commission alleged that Article 29 permits the interpretation of
rights under the Convention to avoid diminishing rights guaranteed
by other international conventions to which Guatemala is a party.
The Court's findings are worth reiterating here:
The Court considers that it has been proved that ... an internal conflict
was taking place in Guatemala ... As has previously been stated ....
instead of exonerating the State from its obligations to respect and
guarantee human rights, this fact obliged it to act in accordance with such
obligations. Therefore, and as established in Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, confronted with an internal
armed conflict, the State should grant those persons who are not
participating directly in the hostilities or who have been placed hors de
combat for whatever reason, humane treatment, without any unfavorable
conditions. In particular, international humanitarian law prohibits attempts
against the life and personal integrity of those mentioned above, at any
place and time.
42
Although the Court lacks competence to declare that a State is
internationally responsible for the violation of international treaties that
do not grant it such competence, it can observe that certain acts or
omissions that violate human rights, pursuant to the treaties that they do
have competence to apply, also violate other international instruments for
the protection of the individual, such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and, in particular, common Article 3.43
As a consequence, the Court ruled that there was a violation of
Article 1 (1) (obligation to respect and ensure rights protected under
the Convention) for the general impunity with regard to these
violations. As in Paniagua Morales, the Court defined impunity as:
the total lack of investigation, prosecution, capture, trial and conviction of
those responsible for violations of the rights protected by the American
Convention, in view of the fact that the State has the obligation to use all
the legal means at its disposal to combat that situation, since impunity
fosters chronic recidivism of human rights violations and total
defenselessness of victims and their relatives.
4 4
42. Id. para. 207 (emphasis added).
43. Id. para. 208 (emphasis added).
44. Id. para. 211 (quoting Paniagua Morales et al. Case, Judgment of Mar. 8,
1998, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 37 (1998), available at
2003]
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Judge Can~ado, in his concurring opinion, reminds us that no
person is an island and applauds the Court's decision to formally
recognize the family members of the disappeared as victims of
inhumane treatment in their own right. For his part, Judge Salgado-
Pesantes argues for a more explicit doctrine on the right to truth that
would give it defining characteristics beyond the existing guarantees
contained in Articles 8 and 25, accounting for the fact that the right
to truth has a moral component, and may imply varying degrees of
responsibility.
The contribution of the Bamaca Velasquez case to the scheme of
reparations can be found in the Commission's creative proffer of
evidence, which paints a vivid picture of the suffering caused to the
victim and his family.4 5 Although not qualified as expert witnesses, a
Guatemalan anthropologist and a Guatemalan Mayan-indigenous
leader and ex-congresswoman testified in support of the reparations
claim. An expert psychologist specializing in trans-cultural
evaluations and treatment of trauma also testified. The three
witnesses together provided the basis for determining the
consequences of the victim's manner of death and how his life might
have developed, had he survived. The witnesses substantiated two
claims: first, concerning lost wages, that had Efrain Bdmaca survived
the signing of the Peace Accords, he would have been gainfully
employed as a political or community leader on behalf of a
reconstituted URNG; 46 and second, that as the eldest son in a Mayan-
Main indigenous family, his loss and the inability of the family to
perform a ritual burial of his remains has caused a severe rupture of
family cohesion and corresponding suffering.
The psychologist explained that in Main belief and custom, the
deceased members of the family remain present in the emotional
http://www.tulane.edu/-libweb/RESTRICTED/CERIGUA/1999-0107.txt (last
visited Feb. 25, 2003).
45. Bamaca Velasquez Case, Reparations, Judgment of Feb. 22, 2002, Inter-
Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 91 (2002).
46. See generally URNG Registered as Political Party, CERIGUA WEEKLY
BRIEFS, No. 1, Jan. 7, 1999, available at
http://www.eecs.umich.edu/-pavr/harbury/archive/1999/cwb0 1_99.html#Head5
(explaining that the Guatemalan Peace Accords provided for the transformation of
the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) into a registered
political party, subsequent to a period of demobilization of its guerrilla forces).
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"constellation" of the surviving family's ties. That expert testified to
the importance of recovering his mortal remains, which, in the words
of the family, lies in the "ability to show respect for Efrain, to have
him close and to return him or take him to live with his ancestors,"
and for the new generations to be able to share and learn what his life
was as is the Main tradition. Whether spiritual or metaphorical,47 this
lack of closure is experienced by the family and generates continuing
anguish and anxiety for them.
The Court reiterated its rule that there is no need to prove non-
material damages in the case of a victim's parents. Those emotional
ties and resulting suffering from a family member's loss are
considered a given, and are not broken by the years that they were
separated. Moreover, the Court ruled, given "the particularities of the
Main ethnicity of the Mayan culture, the loss of the emotional and
economic support of the oldest son signified great suffering for the
Bdmaca-Velasquez nuclear family."48  The Court awarded
compensation for moral damages in the amount of $25,000 to
Bdmaca's father for his suffering due to the knowledge of what the
victim had suffered, and for the anguish and vulnerability provoked
by the non-protection of the State. Bdmaca's father also received a
proportional share of the $100,000 award to the victim himself, for
his son's suffering prior to his death. The victim's siblings received
awards of $5,000 to $20,000 each under this rubric, and his wife,
$80,000. In justifying the award, the court pointed to the
extraordinary efforts of Jennifer Harbury to locate her spouse or his
remains and the consistent obstacles and obfuscation by the State in
resisting that search.49
Lost wages were awarded to the victim and his surviving wife.
The Court refrained from awarding lost wages for the five-year
period from his capture to the signing of the Peace Accords in
47. The concurring opinion of Judge Garcia asserts that the need for burial and
closure of a loved one is a universal sentiment, and not reserved to one or another
culture.
48. Bamaca Velasquez Case, Reparations, Judgment of Feb. 22, 2002, Inter-
Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 91 (2002).
49. Jennifer Harbury engaged in three extended hunger strikes, one of which
was held in front of public offices in Guatemala City. She also expended efforts on
legal remedies inside and outside of Guatemala.
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Guatemala, since arguably he would have been employed as a
guerrilla commander without any remuneration. However, from the
signing of the Peace Accords, and for a reasonable period of his life
expectancy, the Court found that he would have been working. With
no clear criteria for settling on a projection for wages, the Court
awarded $100,000 in equity.5" In the distribution of this award, the
Court noted that had he lived, Bdmaca would have contributed a
portion of this income to his parents and siblings and therefore, the
award was divided evenly among his surviving wife, his father and
his siblings. Jennifer Harbury was also awarded lost wages, in
consideration of having suspended her employment to dedicate
herself to the search for her husband from 1992 to 1997, and for
related health costs; for example, the illness provoked by her hunger
strike, which was directed at learning the whereabouts of her
husband. In all, money damages were awarded in the amount of
$475,000.
In its discussion of other reparations, the Court reiterates the
parameters of the right to truth as accruing to both the individual and
society as a whole. The decision to frame reparations in this manner
is not gratuitous. The State had previously asserted it made several
efforts to further the process of identification of the remains of the
dead and disappeared after the civil war. The Court cited the State's
inclusion of the Bimaca case in the report of the Guatemalan
Historical Clarification Commission as a form of reparation. The
State also invoked the creation of a National Program to Search for
the Disappeared, a National Program of Exhumations, and the
proposal for a Commission on Peace and Harmony as
demonstrations of the government's will to "promote and spur
investigations to clarify the cases analyzed by the Court."51 Despite
these assertions, to date the only success in identifying victims or
calling to account those responsible for the nearly 200,000 dead and
disappeared during the civil war have been made by the victims, their
families, or non-governmental organizations. In fact, many of those
50. The concurring opinion of Judge Garcia disputes the relevancy of the
Court's regular criteria for calculating lost wages and suggests that all awards for
lost wages should be founded on equitable grounds.
5 1. Bamaca Velasquez Case, Reparations, Judgment of Feb. 22, 2002, Inter-
Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 91 (2002), para. 71.
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individuals and organizations making efforts to clarify past violations
have been subject to break-ins, harassment, threats, and assaults over
the past two years, none of which have resulted in arrests or
convictions.
The Bdmaca case is emblematic of the human rights and
humanitarian law violations committed during the war, where the
State systematically violated the right to life of civilians and
defenseless combatants. The Truth Commission's recommendations,
based on a finding that 93% of the victims were killed or disappeared
by State agents, have yet to be complied with by the State.5 2
Against this background, the Court ordered the Guatemalan State
to adopt all legislative or other measures necessary to adapt the
Guatemalan legal framework to international human rights and
humanitarian law norms and to fully implement those norms on the
domestic level. The Court also ordered the State to find Bdmaca's
remains, to conduct the exhumation in the presence of his widow and
family, and to hand his remains over to his family.
2. Baena Ricardo et al. Case (270 Workers v. Panama)
The Court's decision on merits and reparations in the Baena
Ricardo et al. case53 stands out for at least two important reasons.
First, the decision deals with the largest number of individual victims
before the Court in a single case - 270 state employees who were
fired for their participation in a labor rights demonstration. While the
Court has dealt with mass violations in the past, this is the first such
case to arise in a context in which the victims were not the subject of
violent state crimes or widespread civil unrest. Second, the decision
deals primarily with worker's rights, an area traditionally associated
with economic, social, and cultural human rights, as opposed to the
Court's traditional focus on gross violations and civil and political
rights.
52. S~ptimo Informe del Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas sobre La
Verificaci6n de los Acuerdos de Paz de Guatemala, 1 de abril de 2001 al 30 de
abril de 2002, paras. 26-27, available at www.minugua.guate.net (last visited Nov.
1,2002).
53. Brena Ricardo et al. Case, Judgment of Feb. 2, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 72 (2001), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/72-
ing.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
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The case arose out of a labor dispute between the Panamanian
government and state employees, who were represented by the
Coordinating Organization of State Enterprise Workers Unions. In
November of 1990, the government rejected a petition from the
Coordinating Organization that raised concerns and demands of the
union collective. Subsequently, the Coordinating Organization called
for a public protest march on December 4, 1990, and a twenty-four-
hour work stoppage the next day. The protest march, which was
intended to focus attention on the unions' demands, was carried .out
peacefully with the participation of thousands of workers.54
However, in what seems to have been a bizarre coincidence, the
day of the march coincided with the escape of colonel Eduardo
Herrera-Hassan from a Panamanian island prison, and his subsequent
forced takeover of police buildings with other dissident members of
the military who were apparently attempting to carry out a coup. The
union group's work stoppage, which had already begun as scheduled
for December 5th, was suspended during that day to prevent its being
associated with the activities of colonel Herrera-Hassan. No essential
public services were interrupted during the work stoppage. U.S.
military forces arrested the colonel as he attempted to mount a march
on the national legislature on the morning of December 5th, and he
was turned over to the Panamanian government that same day.
During the critical period in question, the President of Panama,
Guillermo Endara, never issued a formal state of emergency or
suspension of guarantees.
The next day, December 6, 1990, the government, apparently
believing there was a link between the labor action and the dissident
military movement, called for the legislature to draft a bill dismissing
all of the public employees who had participated in the
"organization, convocation or implementation of the work stoppage
of December 5, 1990" because of a belief that the workers "sought to
subvert the democratic constitutional order and to replace it with a
military regime."55 Before any legislation was adopted, most of the
workers suspected of a role in the work stoppage were fired based on
54. Id. para. 88(c).
55. Id. para. 88(i).
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lists developed by managers in the various state agencies in which
they were employed.
The Panamanian Legislative Assembly then adopted Law 25,
designed to address the government's concerns, on December 14,
1990. The law explicitly provided for retroactive effect as of
December 4, 1990, and the Legislative Assembly designed the law to
lapse in December of 1991. Prior to the adoption of Law 25, existing
labor law provisions, which were intended to provide due process in
dismissal proceedings, protected most of the affected state workers.
However, the procedure under Law 25 was summary and not subject
to appeal. The law permitted the executive's Cabinet Council to fire
any public servant who participated in actions "against democracy
and the constitutional order," and the 270 workers who were the
subject of this action were all formally found to have violated Law
25 on January 23, 1991.56 No fired worker was ever charged by the
government with complicity or participation in the illicit actions of
colonel Herrera-Hassan.
Most of the 270 workers involved in the complaint subsequently
filed all available administrative appeals, including an action of
unconstitutionality of Law 25 itself. The Supreme Court of Panama
found the law to be unconstitutional but held that its declaration of
unconstitutionality only struck down the abstract legal rule, thus
leaving the workers without a practical remedy for their firings..
Having exhausted all available domestic remedies, the 270 workers
sought relief in the Inter-American human rights system.
The Inter-American Court settled two preliminary matters before
addressing the specific violations of the Convention. First, it rejected
Panama's argument that Law 25 had arisen in the context of a serious
national emergency that justified its adoption. Panama had not
declared a formal state of emergency, and any such emergency
would have been subject to the provisions of Article 27 of the
Convention, which governs procedures and conditions for suspension
of guarantees in states of emergency. 7 Second, the facts and issues in
this case presented the Court with its first opportunity to apply the
Protocol of San Salvador, the Additional Protocol to the American
56. Id. para. 88(q).
57. Id. paras. 89-94.
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Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. Panama became a party to the Protocol in 1993, but
the Protocol did not enter into force until 1999, well after the events
in question here. Moreover, the treaty has limited direct
enforceability through the Commission and Court.58
The Commission argued, however, that Panama had signed the
Protocol in 1988, thus incurring an international obligation not to act
in violation of the object and purpose of the treaty.59 The government
of Panama argued the non-retroactivity of treaties.60 The Court
concluded, without further elaboration or analysis, that the treaty
could not be applied retroactively, but that Panama's signature to the
treaty nonetheless created a duty "to abstain from committing any act
in opposition to the objective and purpose of the Protocol of San
Salvador, even before its entry into force."'6' The Court did not
further articulate the nature of that duty.
The Court went on to find violations of Articles 9 (Ex Post Facto
Laws), 8(1) and (2) (Judicial Guarantees), 25 (Judicial Protection),
16 (Freedom of Association), and the general obligations provided
for in Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention of Human
Rights. It rejected the argument that Panama violated the workers'
right to assembly, protected in Article 15 of the Convention,
concluding that the march took place without interruptions or
restrictions, that the workers' dismissal was based only on the work
stoppage and not the march, and that no other proof was offered of
58. See Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in
the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights "Protocol of San Salvador," art.
19(6), O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 69 (1988), reprinted in Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System OEA/Ser.L. V/I1 82
Doc. 6 rev. 1 at 67 (1992) (stating that the Commission and Court may hear
individual complaints that address violations of the right of unions to organize and
the right to education as those rights are articulated in the Protocol, but the
Commission and the Court are limited by the guidelines set out in Articles 44
through 51 and 61 through 69 of the American Convention on Human Rights),
available at http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/teleam/global/ilo/law/oasadd.htm
(last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
59. Baena Ricardo et al. Case, para. 95.
60. Id. para. 96.
61. Id. paras. 98-99.
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interference with the right to "peaceful assembly, without arms,"
protected in Article 15.62
The Court's findings as to violations of Article 9, on ex post facto
application of laws, would seem patently self-evident in the context
of the blatant violations perpetrated in the adoption and
implementation of Law 25, were this situation not so common
throughout the world. The clarity of the violation here hopefully
provides a solid framework for analysis of such post hoc attempts by
governments to punish dissident behavior in the future. The same
seems true with the violations of the right to freedom of association,
protected by Article 16, which the Court properly read as "the ability
to constitute labour union organizations, and to set into motion their
internal structure, activities and action programme, without any
intervention by the public authorities that could limit or impair the
exercise of the respective right. ' 63 So long as each person is free to
join or not, labor unions have a basic right "to constitute a group for
the pursuit of a lawful goal. ' 64 In reaching its conclusions on the
right to association, the Court drew heavily from a previous decision
by the International Labor Organization ("ILO") Labour Union
Freedom Committee, case no. 1569, which dealt with the same facts,
and to which the State raised no objection.65
The Court's application of the fair trial guarantees of Article 8,
however, was more adventurous. The Court noted that the due
process provisions of Article 8(1) explicitly apply not only in
criminal proceedings but to "the determination of ... rights and
obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature. 66 The Court,
however, quoted that language to conclude that "the range of due
process guarantees established in section 2 of Article 8 of the
Convention is applied to the realms to which reference is made in
62. Id. paras. 148-50.
63. Id. para. 156.
64. Id.
65. Baena Ricardo et al. Case, paras. 162-65, 171. It would seem that the
government of Panama had at least a colorable claim as to duplication of
procedures under Article 33 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure, which would
have barred the Commission from considering the petition. No such claim was
raised.
66. Id. para. 125.
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section 1 of the same Article . . ." and that "the individual has the
right to the due process as construed under the terms of Articles 8(1)
and 8(2) in both, penal matters, as in all of these other domains.'"67
The Court does not discuss or distinguish the explicit language of
section 2 of Article 8, which refers to persons "accused of a criminal
offense," invokes the presumption of innocence in such proceedings,
and details the rights of the "accused. ' 68 For its analytical base, it
relies on decisions of the European Court of Human Rights that
extend similar provisions of the European Convention on Human
Rights to "disciplinary proceedings. '69 The Court apparently
concludes that the flawed administrative procedures for dismissal of
the 270 workers are just such proceedings, thus entitling the workers
to the explicit guarantees of section 8(2), as well as the general
protections of section 8( 1).70
The Court's decision reached the issue of reparations, pursuant to
Article 63(2) of the Convention, in addition to the merits. The Court
found the violations discussed above and ordered the following
restitution: (1) that the 270 workers, or their heirs if they are
deceased, be paid indemnification of back wages "and other labour
rights"'" under domestic law; (2) that the workers be reinstated or
provided with comparable employment alternatives, or where that is
not possible, provided with an indemnity for termination of
employment; (3) that the workers each be paid $3,000 in moral
damages; (4) and that the group of 270 workers be paid $100,000 as
reimbursement for expenses in seeking protection of their rights, and
their representatives be paid $20,000 for the cost of internal and
international proceedings.
67. Id.
68. See id. paras. 122-34 (discussing Article 8 ramifications).
69. Id. paras. 128-29.
70. See id. paras. 13 1-34 (noting the distinction between disciplinary and
punitive power as such that punitive power may only be exercised subject to due
process limitations).
71. Baena Ricardo et al. Case, para. 214(6).
72. Id. para. 214(7)-(9).
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3. The Last Temptation of Christ Case
This case dealt with Chile's prior censorship of the film of the
same name.73 The Commission alleged violations of freedom of
thought, expression, religion and conscience, under Articles 12 and
13 of the Convention. The complaint points to the Chilean Supreme
Court's affirmation of an absolute ban on the film The Last
Temptation of Christ in 1997, based on the application of a 1974 law
and a 1980 Constitutional provision, both part of the Pinochet legacy.
The case was originally taken to the Commission by an association
of Chilean lawyers in representation of some of its members. Amici
briefs to the Court from other interested parties supported their
position, and various legal experts testified on both sides, including
the recently named Inter-American Human Rights Commission
member, Jos6 Zalaquett. Expert testimony addressed the issue of
how the Court should deal with a constitutional provision and its
implementing legislation, both of which effectively violated
Convention guarantees. Some experts argued that a domestic
constitutional reform would be necessary, while others asserted that a
legislative reform would suffice, and still others urged that the law
was sufficient to protect rights, but that the Supreme Court had
misapplied it. These positions reflected divergent views on the effect
and interpretation of international human rights law in domestic legal
systems.
A significant component of this debate centered on the Chilean
Supreme Court's determination of the parameters of the
constitutional right to "honor" and the relationship of that term to
religious freedom, to the detriment of both the right to choose one's
religion, or lack thereof, and to the freedom of expression. The facts
of the case reflect the heated social debate around this issue in Chile,
with some litigants at the national level bringing actions by or on
behalf of Jesus Christ, the Catholic Church, and in their own names.
Despite approval of a Constitutional reform by one chamber of the
Congress, at the time the Court heard the case final congressional
action was still pending.
73. "The Last Temptation of Christ" Case Judgment of Feb. 5, 2001, Inter-Am
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 73 (2001), available at
http://www 1 .umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/73-ing.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
20031
AM. U. INT'LL. REV.
The State did not contest the facts, but it refused to accept
international responsibility by alleging that the current government
had introduced a constitutional reform that would remedy the
situation domestically. The Court concluded that a system of prior
censorship existed in Chile and that its application in the present case
resulted in a violation of the freedom of expression protections
guaranteed by Article 13 of the American Convention of Human
Rights. The Court reminded Chile that human rights violations are
not merely attributable to one or another individual branch of
government, but rather accrue to the State as a whole. The judgment
pointed to the fact that the Constitutional provision, Article 19
section 12 of the Chilean Constitution, establishes prior censorship
for films and, consequently, qualifies the actions of both the
Executive and the Judiciary, thereby generating State responsibility.74
On the other hand, the Court found there was no violation of the
right to freedom of religion, because the censorship of The Last
Temptation of Christ "did not deprive or diminish any person's right
to keep, change, profess or promote their religion or beliefs with
absolute freedom. ' 75
The State was ordered to modify its legal framework to remove
prior censorship provisions, which were found to violate the
obligation to respect and guarantee the right to freedom of expression
and thought under the Article 13 of the Convention and the general
obligations of Articles l(1) and 2 of the Convention. 76 The State was
also ordered to permit the showing of the film. The judgment was
deemed to be sufficient reparation, and costs were awarded, in
equity, in the amount of $4,290.17
74. Id. para. 72.
75. Id. para. 79.
76. Id. para. 103.
77. Id.
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4. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua18
The indigenous peoples of the Awas Tingni community live in the
richly forested Atlantic coastal region of Nicaragua, an area that they
have occupied with other tribal peoples since antiquity. Their
traditional communal lands were not formally demarcated, but
demarcation only became important when the Nicaraguan
government agreed to a massive logging concession to a Korean
lumber company, Sol de Caribe S.A., or SOLCARSA. Having
unsuccessfully exhausted all available domestic remedies to prevent
the operation of concession, the community sought the protection of
the Commission and Court. The case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Community v. Nicaragua is the first substantive decision of
the Court in the area of indigenous rights.79
The Court found violations of Articles 25 (Judicial Protection) and
21 (Property). Article 25 provides for "simple and prompt
recourse... to a competent court or tribunal for protection of...
fundamental rights" in domestic law or the Convention. s° The Court
analyzed the issue from two perspectives, first as to the land titling
procedure in Nicaragua and second as to the effectiveness of the
relevant domestic remedy, amparo, to meet the requirements of
Article 25.81 The Court first reviewed the domestic norms of
Nicaragua and concluded that there are protections under that law for
indigenous communal real property."s However, the procedure for
titling of such lands is not clearly regulated,83 and the Court accepted
the conclusions of the expert witnesses that "there is a general lack of
knowledge, an uncertainty as to what must be done and to whom
78. The Case of Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua,
Judgment of Aug. 31, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 79 (2001), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecing/index-serie_c-ing.html (last visited Jan. 21,
2003).
79. See Wilson & Perlin, supra note 1, at 331 (discussing admissibility of the
case to the Court).
80. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
144, arts. 21, 25.
81. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No.79, para. 115.
82. Id. paras. 116-22.
83. Id. para. 123.
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should a request for demarcation and titling be submitted. ' 84 Even
the State's own evidence showed "legal ambiguities" in the titling of
indigenous communal lands.85 Finally, since 1990, no land title deeds
had been issued to indigenous communities.86 This led the Court to
conclude that "there is no effective procedure in Nicaragua for
delimitation, demarcation, and titling of indigenous communal
lands."87
As to the effectiveness of the amparo remedy as a means for
judicial protection of tribal rights, the Court noted its previous
jurisprudence recognizing that the remedy, being simple and brief,
meets the required characteristics for effectiveness.88 Moreover, the
Nicaraguan amparo remedy itself provides for conclusion within
forty-five days. In the instant case, however, two separate actions
were filed, one which initially took eight days, but the review of
which took more almost a year and a half.89 The second action took
nearly a year from the time of filing until a decision was reached.90
Neither of these unjustified delays respect the "principle of a
reasonable term" protected by the Convention.9' The State incurred
additional violations of Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention for its
failure to designate and implement an effective remedy in its
domestic norms.9 2
Article 21 of the Convention protects the right to "property"
without further definition. The Court synthesized a definition of
property from its other decisions: "those material things which can
be possessed, as well as any right which may be part of a person's
patrimony; that concept includes all moveables and immovables,
corporeal and incorporeal elements and any other intangible object
84. Id. para. 124.
85. Id. para. 125.
86. Id. para. 126.
87. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No.79, para. 127.
88. Id. para. 131.
89. Id. para. 132.
90. Id. para. 133.
91. Id. para. 134.
92. Id. paras. 135-39.
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capable of having value."93 Applying that definition to the evolving
interpretation of the Convention, the Court concluded that "article 21
of the Convention protects the right to property in a sense that
includes, among others, the rights of members of the indigenous
communities within the framework of communal property."94 Thus,
the members of the Awas Tingni community have "a communal
property right to the lands they currently inhabit, without detriment
to the rights of other indigenous communities."95 That right, in turn,
gave the community the right to have their lands delimited, and
during that process, to prevent the State itself, or third parties acting
with State acquiescence, from actions which would "affect the
existence, value, use or enjoyment" of the area where the community
lives.96
The Court limited its decision to these two violations, although the
Commission had alleged the breach of several other Convention
provisions in its final pleadings.97 The Court "dismissed" the
violation of those rights, however, because the Commission's brief
had failed to provide grounds for the violations.98
The Court reached the issue of reparations in this decision as well
by applying Article 63 of the Convention. It required that the State
create an effective mechanism for demarcation and titling of
indigenous communal property, and that the State carry out that
process within fifteen months, "with full participation by the
Community and taking into account its customary law, values,
customs and mores." 99 The State was further barred from interference
93. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No.79, para. 144.
94. Id. para. 148.
95. Id. para. 149.
96. Id. para. 153.
97. See id. para. 156 (noting that he Commission alleged violations of a
combination of the following articles of the Convention: Article 4 (Right to Life),
Article 11 (Right to Privacy), Article 12 (Freedom of Conscience and Religion),
Article 16 (Freedom of Association), Article 17 (Rights of the Family), Article 22
(Freedom of Movement and Residence), and Article 23 (Right to Participate in
Government)).
98. Id. para. 157.
99. Id. para. 167.
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with the property right pending its full establishment. 0 The Court
found that the Commission had not proven material damages, but
found that the community had suffered "immaterial" (non-pecuniary)
damages that require a State investment of $50,000 "in works or
services of collective interest for the benefit of the Awas Tingni
Community."'' It also ordered payment of an additional $30,000 to
the community and its representatives for expenses and costs. Judge
Montiel Argiiello, the ad hoc judge Nicaragua appointed for this
case, dissented on most issues.
In September of 2002, more than a year after its initial judgment,
the Court requested Nicaragua to provide provisional measures of
protection under Article 63(2) of the Convention. It ordered that the
State prevent any further exploitation of natural resources within the
communal lands of the Awas Tingni Community, that the
Community be permitted to participate in the planning and
implementation of any measures affecting its lands, and that the State
investigate and sanction any of the wrongs alleged in the request for
provisional measures. 102
5. Las Palmeras Case
The decision of the Court in the Las Palmeras Case °3 seemed
straightforward on the facts but provoked an odd set of opinions on
the merits. This case involved an attack by military and police forces
on a rural schoolhouse in Las Palmeras, Columbia. In its decision on
admissibility, the Court held that it was barred from direct
100. Id. para. 164.
101. Id. para. 157.
102. Resolucion de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos de 6 de
Septiembre de 2002, Medidas Provisionales Solicitadas por los Representantes de
las Victimas Respecto de la Republica de Nicaragua, Communidad Mayagna
(Sumo) Awas Tingni [Resolution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of
Sept. 6, 2002, Provisional Measures Sought by the Representatives of the Victims
Respecting the Republic of Nicaragua, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni
Community].
103. Las Palmeras Case, Judgment of Dec. 6, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 90 (2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecing/serie-c-90-ing.doc
(last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
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application of international humanitarian law.104 As to the relatives of
those who had been killed in that attack, the Court found violations
of the right to judicial guarantees and judicial protection, under
Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of the Convention. 05 The case, however, had
three interesting aspects, from an analytical perspective.
First, the Court was deeply divided over the legal effects of a
domestic decision by Colombia's Administrative Law Court of the
Council of State, the domestic forum of final appeal in administrative
matters. That court had upheld a lower court ruling finding State
responsibility for the same incident at issue before the Court. The
Court found that by virtue of the fact that the issue had been
"definitively settled under domestic law," State responsibility
"became res judicata," because the Court did not need to provide
"approval" or "confirmation" of the domestic tribunal's
conclusion.10 6 This conclusion regarding the effects of a decision by
a domestic administrative tribunal flies in the face of previous
practice of the Court which demanded that individual perpetrators of
human rights violations be investigated, prosecuted, and punished,
and not merely that the State accept responsibility for its wrongs.
Second, the reasoning of the judgment on the issue of legal effects
of the domestic decision deeply fractured the Court, provoking
responses from five of the judges in two separate opinions. The gist
of those opinions was that the Court could and should have found
separate and distinct violations of international law by the State,
particularly as to Article 4, which protects the right to life.0 7 The
separate opinions are not characterized as dissents; such is seldom
the case in the Court's contentious jurisprudence. However, the
separate opinions take strong issue with the judgment itself, leaving
one to wonder what constitutes a "majority" view of the law when
five of seven judges write to distance themselves from the Court's
"per curium" decision.
104. See Wilson & Perlin, supra note 1, at 331-32 (discussing the admissibility
decision by the Court).
105. Las Palmeras Case, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 90, paras. 49-66.
106. Id. paras. 33-34.
107. See Las Palmeras Case, Preliminary Objection, Judgment of Feb. 4, 2000,
Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 67 (2000), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecing/serie-c-67_ing.doc (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
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Third, in its extended discussion of the factual evidence, the Court
rejected the Commission's assertion that one of the victims had been
summarily executed. The Commission based that claim on testimony
from an internationally recognized forensic ballistics expert
suggested by the Court. 0 The Court held , with no discussion, that
the expert's conclusion, though included in his report to the Court,
was "not based on any reasoned logic, and therefore lacked any
evidentiary value."'0 9  Given the Court's generally solicitous
consideration of evidence under its rules and practice, this curt
dismissal of expert findings is troubling, particularly given the
Court's increased reliance on expert testimony in its contentious
jurisprudence. Here, the holding seems particularly unusual, given
the judges' involvement in the selection of the very expert they later
criticize. The Court ordered the case to proceed to the reparations
stage.
6. Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago
[Me] During 2001 and 2002, the Court decided both the
admissibility and merits of a collection of death penalty cases from
Trinidad and Tobago ("Trinidad"). The Court first considered
Trinidad's preliminary objections in three separate cases, the Hilaire
Case, the Benjamin et al. Case, and the Constantine et al. Case."10
The cases were later consolidated for disposition on the merits and
reparations under the name Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al.
v. Trinidad and Tobago. II All of these cases present complex issues
108. Las Palmeras Case, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 90, para. 45.
109. Id. para. 46.
110. The Court rendered all three judgments on preliminary objections in these
cases on September 1, 2001. See Hilaire Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment
of Sept. 1, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 80 (2001); Benjamin et al. Case,
Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Sept. 1, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No.
81 (2001); Constantine et al. Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Sept. 1,
2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 82 (2001), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecing/index-serie-c_ing.html (last visited Jan. 21,
2003).
111. Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. Case, Judgment of June 21, 2002,
Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 94 (2002), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/Serie-c-94-ing.doc (last visited Jan. 21, 2003); see also
Wilson & Perlin, supra note 1, at 344-46 (providing the decisions by the
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of treaty application and treaty reservations, arising from Trinidad's
aggressive efforts to defend its death penalty regime. Because of its
desire to speed up executions, Trinidad withdrew its ratification of
the Convention on May 26, 1999, one year after its announced
intention to do so." l2 The Commission and Court nonetheless
continue to apply the Convention to all pending cases that arose
when the Convention was in effect. " 3
The major issue in the preliminary objections stage, common to all
three cases, was the validity of a reservation Trinidad formulated at
the time it accepted the Court's jurisdiction. The reservation stated
that the Court would only take jurisdiction to the extent that it was
consistent with the Constitution of Trinidad. Because the
Constitution of Trinidad permits the death penalty, Trinidad
attempted to invoke the reservation as a bar to the Court's exercise of
jurisdiction in death penalty cases. Alternatively, it argued that the
Court would still lack jurisdiction if it struck down the reservation as
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, because
the original declaration was conditioned on that reservation, and the
declaration itself would therefore be null and void ab initio. The
Court rejected both positions, relying on decisions in Peruvian cases
that had held that the Court cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction by
unilateral acts of the State once that jurisdiction has been accepted. '"
Trinidad's reservation, the Court held, would totally subordinate
the application of the Convention to the domestic law of Trinidad
and Tobago, subject to the disposition of the domestic courts."5 The
Commission in other death penalty cases from the Caribbean region during 1999
and 2000).
112. See generally Natasha Parassram Concepcion, Note, The Legal
Implications of Trinidad & Tobago's Withdrawal From the American Convention
on Human Rights, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 847 (2001) (discussing the legal
effects of Trinidad's withdrawal).
113. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAs, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 337 (3rd ed. 2002) (noting that even after the denunciation
took full effect Trinidad was still subject to the petition procedure of the
Commission for violations of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man).
114. Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. Case, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 94, paras 81-83.
115. Id. para. 88.
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Court also rejected the government's alternative argument, that if the
Court found the reservation incompatible with the Convention, the
State's intention was to not accept the jurisdiction of the Court at
all." 6 It asserted that the State's argument would allow it to decide
the scope of its acceptance of the contentious jurisdiction of the
Court in every specific case, to the detriment of the exercise of the
contentious function of the Court. Such discretionary power would
deprive the Court of "all efficacy" in the exercise of its contentious
jurisdiction." 7 The Court reached similar decisions on preliminary
objections in the Constantine et al. and Benjamin et al. cases. "I
The merits decision in Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al.,
by virtue of its consolidation with other cases, dealt with a total of
thirty-two defendants on death row in Trinidad, all of whom
appeared as victims before the Court.' 9 At the outset of its opinion,
the Court noted that despite the issuance of provisional measures to
prevent execution of the alleged victims, on June 4, 1999, Trinidad
executed Joey Ramiah, one of the individuals protected by
provisional measures.' 2 ° Later in its decision, the Court found that
Ramiah's execution violated the right to life in Article 4, and also
found a separate violation of Article 4 in the State's "disregard of a
116. Id.para.91.
117. Id. para. 92.
118. The logic of the Court in striking down Trinidad's reservation seems
equally applicable to U.S. treaty reservations that attempt to limit application of
ratified human rights treaties to the scope of the application of the U.S.
Constitution. For example, the reservation to Article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, states that the meaning of the term "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" in the Covenant "means the cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and/or
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States." See U.S.
Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 75 (Louis
Henkin et al. eds. 2001).
119. Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al., Case, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 94, para. 3.
120. Id. paras. 26-33; see also Schabas, supra note 110, at 335-36 (noting that
Trinidad raised the same arguments as it had in the Court -jurisdiction limited to
that protected in the Trinidad constitution - to argue that the Commission lacked
the power to issue binding provisional measures). It also notes a second execution
in violation of the provisional measures, that of Anthony Briggs on July 28, 1999.
Id.
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direct order of the Court" directing the issuance of provisional
measures to preserve Ramiah's life.'12
The heart of the opinion, however, goes to both substantive and
procedural questions regarding Trinidad's mandatory application of
the death penalty. The Court held that mandatory death sentences for
all persons convicted of murder in Trinidad violates the
Convention's Article 4(1) protection against "arbitrary" imposition
of the death penalty, 22 as well as Article 4(2), which limits death
sentences to "the most serious crimes. 123 Uniform death sentences
for all murder convictions, without recognition that there are varying
degrees of seriousness for the crime of murder, does not sufficiently
limit the application of capital punishment in a treaty "designed to
bring about its gradual disappearance." 1 24 In reaching its conclusions,
the Court cited decisions from the Human Rights Committee and the
Supreme Courts of India, South Africa, and the United States.
Because it found violations of Articles 1 (1) and 2 along with those of
Article 4, the Court struck down Trinidad's death penalty law as
facially violative of the Convention. 125
The Court also found serious procedural flaws in Trinidad's death
penalty law. The Court addressed what it called the due process
"bundle of rights and guarantees" that take on particular importance
when life is at stake because of the "exceptionally serious and
irreparable nature of the death penalty."' 126 Thus, it found violations
of Articles 7(5) and 8(1) of the Convention due to the failure of
Trinidad's domestic law to protect the right to trial within a
reasonable time; violations of Articles 8 and 25 due to the lack of
access to adequate legal assistance for the presentation of
constitutional motions on review; and the facial invalidity of a
provision of Trinidad's constitution that bars domestic constitutional
121. Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. Case, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 94, paras. 198-200.
122. Id. para. 103.
123. Id. para. 106.
124. Id. para. 99.
125. Id. para. 116.
126. Id. para. 148.
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challenge to certain aspects of the death penalty.127 Finally, the Court
found that the failure to provide for a "fair and transparent
procedure" for pursuit of amnesty, pardon, or commutation of death
sentences violated Articles 4(6) and Article 8's due process
guarantees. 128
Article 5 of the Convention protects against cruel, inhuman, or
degrading punishment or treatment. The Court concluded that the
shocking prison conditions in which death sentenced inmates live
constitute a violation of that article. 29 Again, the Court relied on
jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights and the
Human Rights Committee in reaching its conclusions.
The Court went on to order reparations in its merits judgment. It
barred Trinidad from application of the death penalty law that
violated the Convention, and it ordered Trinidad to adopt graduated
categories of murder. It ordered the retrial of all thirty-one
individuals who had petitioned the Commission for protection and
barred, on grounds of equity, their re-sentencing to death, even if
they were again convicted. The Court ordered payment of $50,000
for the support and education of Joey Ramiah's son, and $10,000 to
his mother. It directed Trinidad to bring its prison conditions into
compliance with relevant international human rights norms. Finally,
the Court ordered $13,000 in expenses for the representation of the
victims in international proceedings before the Court. Although three
judges wrote separate opinions on various aspects of the judgment,
none dissented from the Court's conclusions.
In September of 2002, the Court rescinded orders for provisional
measures in favor of two individuals who had been resentenced to
manslaughter. In the same decision, James et al. Cases,130 the Court
continued provisional measures for another thirty-nine individuals
still under sentence of death in Trinidad.
127. Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al., Case, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 94, para. 152.
128. Id. paras. 186-88.
129. Id. para. 169.
130. James et al. Case, Provisional Measures, Order of Sept. 3, 2002, available
at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index-ingles.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
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C. ADVISORY OPINIONS
In a relatively short time period for the Court, it accepted a request
from the Commission for Advisory Opinion OC-17 on March 30,
2001, and rendered its decision on August 28, 2002, a year and a half
later."' The opinion, Legal Status and Human Rights of the Child,
defines a "child" as person who has not yet reached his or her
eighteenth birthday. 132 The opinion finds that children are rights-
holders themselves, and not merely objects of the law, although
different treatment of minors and adults is not per se
discriminatory. 3  The opinion elaborates upon the meaning of the
phrase "best interests of the child" and discusses the duties of
families, society, and the State in relation to children. 34 It also
delineates the rights of the child in judicial and administrative
proceedings.'35 The opinion, in short, provides a rich synthesis of the
existing international human rights protections of children.
In May of 2002, the government of Mexico sought an advisory
opinion on the rights of migrants in general, and particularly migrant
workers. 3 6 The Court accepted the request, which will become
Advisory Opinion OC- 18.
D. DECISIONS ON REPARATIONS ONLY
The Court's judgments on reparations reflect the increasing
recourse of litigants to the creative use of expert witnesses. Also
reflected in these decisions is the State representatives' active
participation in the process. Certainly, the Peruvian and Guatemalan
131. Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, Aug. 28, 2002, solicited by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Condici6n Juridica y Derechos
Humanos del Nifio (Legal Condition and Human Rights of the Child), available at
http://www.iin.oea.org/Corte-interamericanaderechoshumanos.pdf (last visited
Feb. 9, 2003).
132. Id. para. 42.
133. Id. para. 55.
134. See id. paras. 56-91.
135. See id. paras. 92-136.
136. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Press Release CDH-CP-06/02
ENGLISH, July 15, 2002, available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/prensa-ing/cp_06-02-eng.htm (last visited Jan. 21,
2003).
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governments and their new policies of engagement with the Inter-
American system have contributed to this new emphasis.
1. Reparations Cases Arising from Earlier Judgments
The reparations decisions in this section correspond to contested
cases with previous merits determinations by the Court. These
include two cases from Guatemala: The Street Children Case
(Villagran-Kramer), involving the murder of children by State
security forces; and the Panel Blanca Case (White Van Case),
involving the abduction, torture, and murder of numerous individuals
by State police forces. Trujillo Oroza, a case of forced disappearance
from Bolivia, is also discussed in this section.
The Court ordered Guatemala to pay reparations in the "Street
Children Case, " Villagran Morales et al. v. Guatemala.'37 This case
dealt with the torture and murder committed by State authorities of
five children who were living on the street at the time they were
taken into State custody. The Court first addressed the issue of
monetary damages. In calculating the earning potential of the
murdered children, all of whom had minimum educations and
occasional employment, the Court used the monthly minimum wage
for non-agricultural activities in Guatemala, which translated, in
1990, to about $81.138 Given the life expectancies of the children in
Guatemala in 1990, which ranged from about forty-eight to fifty
years, "'39 the Court awarded damages of between about $28,000 and
$32,250 to the families of the victims. 40 The Court also awarded
non-pecuniary damages to the families, including damages for both
the victims' loss of life and the suffering of their families. Thus,
reparations to the heirs and assigns of the victims were between
$23,000 and $30,000, while mothers and grandmothers were
awarded $26,000 each. Siblings received $3,000 each. 4'
137. The "Street Children" Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1) American Convention
on Human Rights), Judgment of May 26, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 77
(2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecing/index-serie-c-ing.html
(last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
138. Id. para. 81.
139. Id. para. 69.
140. Id. para. 82.
141. Id. para. 93.
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In other reparations, the Court ordered Guatemala to adopt
measures to protect the rights of the child, consistent with Article 19
of the Convention. The Court ordered Guatemala to provide
resources to transfer the remains of one of the victims to a place of
burial chosen by his next of kin and to designate an educational
center with a name allusive to the victims and a plaque in their
honor. The State must also investigate the facts of this case and
identify and punish those responsible for offenses against the
victims. 42 Judge Cancado Trindade wrote a long separate opinion on
the concepts of victimization, suffering, and rehabilitation of child
victims of human rights violations, while Judge de Roux wrote on his
own concept of non-pecuniary damages in cases such as this.
The reparations decision in Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia43 represented
the final phase of the first case at the Court against Bolivia, involving
a single disappearance thirty years ago. The victim, Jose Carlos
Trujillo Oroza, was twenty-two years old and a university student in
Santa Cruz, Bolivia when he was last seen in government custody in
February of 1972.114 As in other reparations decisions, the Court first
determined who the appropriate beneficiaries or "injured parties"
were, particularly when the victim was missing and presumed dead.
The immediate family of the victim is included in this group of
beneficiaries, which is made up of children, parents, and siblings. 45
In this case, the material or pecuniary damages amounted to $3,000
in costs for the search for the victim, $20,000 in medical expenses
for the mother of the victim, and $130,000 in lost earnings for the
victim, who would have graduated from college with a life
expectancy of sixty-four.1 46 Non-pecuniary damages, which are to
compensate for pain and suffering as well as alterations in the
lifestyle of the surviving family members, amounted to $100,000 for
the victim himself (paid to the mother), $80,000 to the mother,
142. Id. para. 123.
143. Trujillo Oroza Case, Reparaciones (Art. 63(1) American Convention on
Human Rights), Judgment of Feb. 27, 2002, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 92
(2002). See also Wilson & Perlin, supra note 1, at 333 (discussing Bolivia's
acceptance of state responsibility in the Trujillo Oroza Case).
144. id. para. 53(a).
145. Id. para. 57.
146. Id. para. 75.
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$25,000 to the adoptive father, and $20,000 each to two brothers, for
a total of $245,000.
The Court also ordered other forms of reparation. First, it called on
Bolivia to use all necessary means to locate the remains of the victim
and return them to the family. Second, the Court required the
government to codify the offense of forced disappearance of persons,
particularly since it had ratified the regional treaty on that subject.
Third, the government was required to investigate, identify, and
punish the responsible persons. Fourth, the decision of the Court on
the merits in this case was to be published in the official national
legal newspaper for legal notices. Fifth, the government was
expected to adopt legislation to prevent the recurrence of such
offenses that occurred in the present case. Finally, the government
was required to name a school in Santa Cruz, the victim's hometown,
for the victim. 47
The final reparations judgment against Guatemala during this
period was the White Van case. ' 4 Despite having been decided on
the merits in 1998 based on facts occurring in 1987-88, the
reparations stage was delayed further because there were difficulties
in locating the victims or their surviving family members. The Court
charged the Commission with finding the beneficiaries and ordered
the State to issue a public media announcement to that end. Family
members of all six murdered victims gave testimony at the hearing.
Three of the four survivors, all previously victims of arbitrary
detention, were never located.
The facts of this case involved the arbitrary detention of ten
civilians who were seen being forced into a white van by Treasury
Police. Six of these victims' bodies were later found with signs of
torture, and two of the survivors had signs of torture. The
coincidence in circumstances and modus operandi led to the
conclusion that the perpetrators were State agents able to act with
impunity in broad daylight. A report reflecting the limited
investigations of the Guatemalan National Police corroborated the
147. Id. paras. 94-122.
148. The "White Van" Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1) American Convention on
Human Rights), Judgment of May 25, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 76
(2002), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecing/index-serie-c-ing.htmi
(last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
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involvement of State agents in these detentions and deaths, while the
testimony of other witnesses demonstrated the intimidation of judges
involved in the investigation of the case and the ineffectiveness of
habeas corpus relief in Guatemala during that period.
Two expert witnesses also testified. One, an economist, offered a
detailed analysis of the calculation of lost wages that would account
for changes in circumstances affecting the projection of average
wages at different points in time. The expert also projected changes
in wage-earning capacity of people throughout their careers, among
other variables. As a result of his testimony, the Court employed a
more sophisticated analysis in its calculations, resulting in greater
damage awards for the beneficiaries.
The psychological expert substantiated the causal relationship
between the underlying violation and the psychosomatic illnesses
that affected victims and surviving family members, restricting their
ability to function normally and to realize their full potential on both
economic and affective levels. As a result, the Court ordered non-
material or moral damages represented by physical and emotional
pain, suffering and trauma, and the resulting dispersion of family
members, along with material damages represented by lost wages
and costs associated with the underlying violations, such as the
victims' exhumation and burial or the survivors' medical treatment.
Attorney's fees were also awarded, and the Court ordered the State
to investigate and punish those responsible, including taking
legislative, administrative, or any other type of necessary steps to
guarantee the certainty and publicity of a detainee registry, to avoid
violations in the fashion documented in the White Van Case.
2. Reparations Decisions Based on Agreement of the Parties
As in the Peruvian case of Barrios Altos, the following reparations
judgments were the product of some level of agreement between the
accused State, the victims, their representatives, and the
Commission. 149 While the scope of agreement varies, ranging from a
149. Durand and Ugarte Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1) American Convention on
Human Rights), Judgment of Dec. 3, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 89
(2001), paras. 17, 19, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/89-
ing.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
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detailed document signed by the concerned parties in the Barrios
Altos Case and Durand and Ugarte to stipulations on the credibility
of testimony in support of the damage claims in the Caracazo Case,
the reparations judgments reflect the spirit of overall cooperation
with the Court. As a result, the work of the Court centers on legally
substantiating the basis, amount, and distribution of the award.
In the Caracazo Case,50 Venezuela conceded responsibility on the
merits and later agreed to accept as credible the testimony proffered
by the victims in the reparations stage, so long as it was sworn to
before a notary public. The Court applied the doctrine of estoppel
when faced with a later retraction by Venezuela as to its accord with
the facts in regard to the scope and conditions of beneficiary family
members. In this connection, the Court elaborated on its rules for
evaluating evidence in reparations cases. The decision states that the
failure to answer a demand or the abandonment of a factual defense
will result in the presumption of the truth of those uncontested facts,
in the absence of full proof to the contrary, so long as. other
evidentiary indicia support the allegations. I5 I
In the Court's evaluation of the evidence, it resorted to the use of
factual presumptions to further substantiate the award of damages,
especially where documentation was unavailable. This approach
seems to have been due, in large part, to the massive numbers of
persons affected, the State's previous efforts to obscure the facts, and
the need to achieve parity for the forty-four victims'52 and their
family members, all of whom were damaged by a single course of
State action.
The presumptions posited that: 1) persons who had disappeared
under violent circumstances and who have been missing for many
years are presumed to be dead; 2) working adults with family spend
most of their income on their families; 3) the victims' family
members assume the burial costs; 4) anyone who reaches the age of
majority engages in income-generating activity that is remunerated,
150. Caso del Caracazo, Sentencia sobre Reparaciones de 29 de agosto de 2002
[Reparations Judgment of August 29, 2002]; see also Wilson & Perlin, supra note
1, at 332-33 (providing the underlying facts of the Del Caracazo case).
15 1. Case del Caracazo, para. 54.
152. The estimated number of dead was 276, but only forty-four are identified
victims in this action.
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at the very least, at the rate of the legal minimum wage in that
country, and even where there is evidence of unemployment or
informal or unstable employment, the presumption would persist;
and, 5) that human rights violations and a reigning situation of
impunity cause pain, anguish, and sadness to the victims and their
surviving family members alike.
These presumptions reflect a fundamental value determination for
the need to indemnify the ongoing consequences of the violations.
They take into account the devastating circumstances of surviving
family members who have not only lost a contributing member of
their household, but who have also been deeply disturbed by the
inability to find or bury the remains of their loved ones, or to see that
justice is done.
Expert psychologist testimony offered by the Commission
provides the basis for evaluating the moral or non-material damages
to surviving family members. It traced the cycle and nature of
trauma, and went so far as to quantify the cost of psychological
treatment, offering estimates of $1,500 to $3,200 per year for
individual and family therapy, although these specific amounts were
not recouped in the Court's final order. While the psychologists
recognized the therapeutic value of testimony before the Court, they
attested to the legitimacy of the reports of psychosomatic illnesses
and depression that result from the trauma of losing a close family
member, as well as the resulting effect on the ability of surviving
family members to work, maintain familial or emotional ties, or to
move their lives forward. Consequently, the marginal economic
status of the victims families in this case is compounded twofold,
first by the untimely death of an economic contributor to the
household, and second by the long-lasting and debilitating
psychological effects that are caused by the loss of a close family
member in the circumstances of an unresolved trauma. The Court's
consideration of these less tangible consequences is especially
encouraging when the projection of lost wages as a measure of
damages will always be less for victims of lower economic means.
The State practices that foreclosed family members' access to
information about the fate of the victims, and the failure to
investigate and punish those responsible for the deaths,
disappearances or injuries, constituted a separate violation of fair
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trial rights and the right to a judicial remedy. These rights, the Court
ruled, accrue to both the victims and their family members under
Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention. The Court found that victims'
family members directly suffered material and non-material damages
on this account. Expert legal testimony offered by the victims'
representatives pointed to the legal mechanisms that helped to
perpetuate the denial of due process and also recommended specific
reforms. These violations were specifically addressed in the
reparations order,'53 which assessed the expenses incurred by family
members who unsuccessfully sought redress through the justice
system as well as the moral or non-material consequences of the
State's failure to respond.
Non-material damages were determined in equity as financial
compensation, provision of services, public acknowledgment of the
acts and their consequences, and the public commitment to take all
necessary measures to prevent their repetition. Some of the
aggravating circumstances affecting non-material or moral damages
included the following: 1) the suffering of the victims before their
death or disappearance, 2) the fact that some of the victims were
children, 3) the continuing suffering of surviving victims who
endured permanent injury, and 4) the pain and loss suffered by
individual family members, and the family unit as a whole. In this
connection, the Court ordered a thirty percent increase in the damage
amount for those cases where the remains of the victims were never
recovered. Some of the no-repetition measures ordered echoed the
concerns of the expert legal witness, who addressed a number of
structural obstacles to accountability. The Court ordered that the
State take a series of steps on policy and implementation levels in
order to ensure that the security forces refrain from using excessive
force in the future. Other non-repetition measures ordered by the
Court address the dignity of the victims, the search for and burial of
the dead and disappeared, and the investigation, prosecution and
sanction of those responsible for the underlying violations.
The award for costs and expenses is also worth mentioning, given
the key role of the victims group Comit& de Familiares de las
Victimas de los Sucesos de Febrero - Marzo de 1989
153. Caso del Caracazo, paras. 67, 74.
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("CONAVIC"), 4 which made it possible for forty-four victims and
their families to pursue this process over thirteen years, beginning
with efforts to seek redress at the national level. The Court awarded
CONAVIC $75,000 for costs and expenses, and an additional
$10,000 in anticipation of the work necessary to facilitate
compliance with the Court's judgment. This award is significant
compared with past awards for attorney's fees or costs, and reflects
the importance of local organization in bringing and litigating cases
of massive human rights violations in the Inter-American system.
All in all, the Court ordered an extraordinary $5,667,300 in
damages and costs of $3,921,500, which were directed at non-
material or moral damages. By far the largest single award of
damages in the Court's history was its award of $2,310,000 in equity
damages for the suffering of the victim's family members generated
by the violations.
E. DECISIONS ON ADMISSIBILITY
The Court accepted some of Argentina's preliminary objections
and rejected others in the case of Cantos v. Argentina.5 ' The case is
another one of first impression, in this case involving the questions
of violations committed against a business entity. Jose Maria Cantos
was the owner of a large business group, a collection of companies
located in the province of Santiago del Estero, Argentina. In March
of 1972, the provincial Revenue Department, while investigating
alleged tax violations, searched the administrative offices of Cantos'
companies, during which officers seized all of the accounting
documentation, company books, records and receipts, as well as
some shares and securities without formal inventory by the
authorities. Following these seizures, the companies suffered serious
financial losses due to the fact that Mr. Cantos lacked access to the
business records that the government had seized.
154. Committee of Family Members of the Victims of the Events of February-
March, 1989.
155. Cantos Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Sept. 7, 2001, Inter-Am
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 85 (2001), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecing/index-serie_c-ing.html (last visited Jan. 21,
2003).
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Cantos pursued various legal remedies for his losses, both
administrative and criminal. Although he achieved an agreement in
1982 with the provincial government that acknowledged its debts to
his group and agreed to pay restitution, the government did not repay
its debt, and he subsequently pursued additional remedies.
Ultimately, in September of 1996, the Supreme Court of Justice of
Argentina ruled against Cantos' various claims and ordered him to
pay costs, which the court set at approximately US $140,000,000.156
The Court addressed two questions: 1) whether a legal entity such
as Campos' companies had standing for protection under the
Convention; and 2) whether State liability would lie for events prior
to Argentina's acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction on September 5,
1984. As to the first question, Argentina referred to the language of
Article 1(2) of the Convention, which states that the term "person" in
the Convention means "every human being."'57 Argentina asserted
that a legal entity does not have human rights. 58 The Court noted the
interpretation of "person" in reports of the Commission, where the
Commission found that the use of the word "does not include legal
entities. 1 59
The Court observed that, "in general, the rights and obligations
attributed to companies become rights and obligations for the
individuals who comprise them or who act in their name or
representation."1 60 Further, the Court asserted that the interpretation
of the Convention advanced by the government "leads to
unreasonable results, because it implies removing an important group
of human rights from protection by the Convention."'' 61 Although the
Convention has not expressly recognized the figure of legal entities,
an individual may be able to resort to the Inter-American system
"when [fundamental human rights] are encompassed in a legal figure
or fiction created by the same system of law." 162 Finally, because Mr.
156. Id. para. 2.
157. Id. para. 22.
158. Id. para. 27.
159. Id. para. 23.
160. Id. para. 27.
161. Cantos Case, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 85, para. 28.
162. Id. para. 29.
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Cantos submitted virtually all of the actions filed in Argentina in his
"own name and in the name of his companies," the Court could
examine the rights of Mr. Cantos in those terms. 163 The Court
referred to its own prior jurisprudence in the Ivcher Bronstein Case,
as well as similar holdings of the European Court of Human Rights,
in which human rights tribunals adjudicated violations of the
individual rights of shareholders in a company. 164 The Court thus
rejected the objection of Argentina.
As to Argentina's acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction,
Argentina explicitly asserted that the jurisdiction of the Court "would
only take effect with regard to acts that occurred after the
ratification" of the Convention.165 Based on that reservation, the
Court explicitly rejected jurisdiction as to all acts occurring in the
1970s and the agreement with the provincial government in 1982.166
As to any ongoing illegality, the only ongoing facts under review are
those occurring after September 5, 1984.167 The 1996 judgment of the
Supreme Judicial Court, however, falls within the Court's
jurisdiction. 168
The Court's new limitation on its jurisdiction as to ongoing
violations is a deeply troubling aspect of this opinion. Although the
limitation purports to be grounded in the specific wording of the
Argentine limitation on acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, it
threatens to undermine the firmly established jurisprudence of the
Court on ongoing violations, which had, until this decision, clearly
extended the Court's jurisdiction to acts occurring before a State's
formal ratification of the Convention. This is perhaps most clearly
demonstrated in the cases of disappearances, where the State's
failure to produce the person or to begin a process of accountability
due to its own actions was seen as a single and continuing course of
State misconduct, both before and after Convention ratification,
which sensibly gave rise to the doctrine of ongoing violations. The
163. Id. para. 30.
164. Id. para. 29, n.ll.
165. Id. para. 32.
166. Cantos Case, para. 38.
167. Id. para. 39.
168. Id. para. 40
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facts and legal posture of this case make it hard to distinguish from
the Court's prior decisions, which the Court neither addresses nor
distinguishes. With these limitations, the Court will now take up the
merits.
The 19 Merchants Case (Alvaro Lobo Pacheco et al. v.
Colombia)169 is simple and straightforward on admissibility issues.
Factually, the case involves the 1987 assassination of nineteen
merchants in two separate incidents in a rural area of Colombia
controlled by paramilitary forces acting with the cooperation or
tolerance of the Colombian military forces in the area. Neither
military nor civilian trials of the perpetrators had been completed a
decade later, when the petitioners sought review before the
Commission.
The Commission decided to take the case to the Court on January
19, 2002, the same day that Colombia submitted its response to the
Commission's previous (and presumably adverse) confidential
report, issued under Article 50 of the Convention. This was also the
last day of the three-month period in which the Commission, under
the strict provisions of Article 51 of the Convention, must decide to
submit a case to the Court.
Colombia argued that the Commission had deprived Colombia of
due process because it could not have reviewed the government's
response with care and consideration before proceeding to the Court.
The Commission responded that the only reason it had to act as it did
was because Colombia had asked for a lengthy extension of time to
submit its response. Consequently, the extension corresponded with
the last day of the time period, and that the response was, in any
event, inadequate to address the Commission's concerns. The Court
agreed, rejected the State's objection, and ordered the case to
proceed on the merits.
169. Alvaro Lobo Pacheco and Otros (19 Comerciantes) v. Columbia, Case
11.603, Report No. 112/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/1I.106 Doc.3 rev. at 204 (1999),
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/112-99.html (last visited Jan.
21, 2003).
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F. NEW CASES TAKEN TO THE COURT
The Annual Reports of the Commission for 2000 and 2001, as
well as various press releases of the Court during 2001 and 2002,
document a number of other cases under consideration by the Court,
none of which have yet resulted in published decisions on
admissibility, merits, or reparations. Cases will be identified below,
with the date on which the Court originally received the case from
the Commission and the subject matter of the dispute.
-Walter David Bulacio v. Argentina, January 24, 2001 - torture
and death of victim, who was taken into police custody on the way to
a rock concert;
-Myrna Mack v. Argentina, June 19, 2001 - extrajudicial killing of
anthropologist by military officers;
-Juan Humberto Sanchez v. Honduras, September 8, 2001 - arrest,
torture, and extrajudicial killing by military officers;
-Torres Benvenuto et al. v. Peru (Five Pensioners Case),
December 4, 2001 - dispute over pension benefits;
-Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, January 9, 2002 - detention,
torture, forced publication of a false statement;
-Peace Community of San Jose de Apartado Case, June 7, 2002 -
paramilitary attack on Colombian village;
-Center for Re-education of Minors Case, May 20, 2002 -
conditions in juvenile detention center in Paraguay, where deaths
resulted from three separate fires; due process in placement of
minors in a juvenile facility;
-Ricardo Cenese v. Paraguay, June 12, 2002 - restrictions
prohibiting presidential candidate from leaving the country as a
result of conviction for defamation of another candidate;
-Lori Berenson v. Peru, July 19, 2002 - U.S. citizen tried by
military court in Peru for treason; due process and fair trial issues;
conditions of confinement;
-Massacre of Plan de Sanchez, July 31, 2002 - attack by
Guatemalan military on Mayan indigenous community.
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II. ACTIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
A. INTRODUCTION
In May and June, 2001, amended Rules of Procedure came into
effect for the Inter-American Commission and Court, respectively.
They represent the culmination of reforms designed to streamline
case processing, 70 develop evidence more methodically,' 7' promote
transparency, 7 2 and provide for greater victim participation'73 at each
stage of the proceedings. The new Commission Rules now
contemplate more specific procedures for producing evidence,
detailing the stages of case processing, providing for friendly
settlement negotiations at any point in the process, and creating a
presumption that all cases will be referred to the Court if
recommendations to the State go unheeded.
A resolution of the OAS has called for an increased budget for the
Commission and the Court, to respond to their increasing activities
and responsibilities with regard to the protection of human rights,
including providing greater access for individuals to the Inter-
American human rights system. The work of the Commission during
the period under review reflects this new focus. The volume of case
reports has increased and includes a number of older cases.
Meanwhile, new cases are being more systematically processed
under the new procedural rules.
The governments of Peru, and more recently Mexico, have gone
through regime and policy changes, reflected in their new
government's openness to human rights concerns. In general, moves
towards democratic consolidation have generated significant changes
in the legal systems of the primarily non-English speaking countries
in the system. Most are engaged in a reform of criminal procedure,
170. See generally Rules of Procedure of the Inter-Am. C.H.R., arts. 29,30,36,
38(3), 41, 43-46 (2001), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic16.htm
(last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
171. See id. arts. 38, 40, 44(2)(e), 46, 62-63, 72.
172. See id. arts. 29, 42(4), 44, 60, 62-64, 66, 68.
173. See id. arts. 41(5), 43(3)(a), 44(2)(a), 71.
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provoking a new sensitivity to due process issues and their
relationship to human rights protections. Moreover, the new Rules of
Procedure provide that the Commission follow-up on its decisions
and evaluate compliance. These changes should translate into more
sophisticated analyses in the Commission and Court decisions of due
process rights and the right to a judicial remedy.
Several thematic reports will also provide a framework for the
consideration of newly admitted petitions on freedom of expression,
migrant rights, and the rights of the child. Reports on these themes
have been published or are forthcoming.174 In 2000, the Office of the
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression published a report to
be used "as a fundamental reference tool to guide the development of
laws on freedom of expression and as a guide to the interpretation of
Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights.' ' 75
Pursuant to OAS resolutions in 2001, reports on the rights of all
migrants and their families and on the situation of human rights
defenders in the Americas are forthcoming. 76 In 2001, the
Commission also created a Human Rights Defenders Functional Unit
within the Executive Secretary's office in Washington. 77
174. See, e.g., Second Progress Report of the Special Rapporteurship on Migrant
Workers and Their Families in the Hemisphere, available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/chap.6a.htm (last visited Jan. 21,
2003); see also Legal Bases, Functions and Activities of the IACHR During
2001,OEA/Ser./L/V/II. 114 doc. 5 rev. (2001), para. 35 (reporting that the Inter-
American Development Bank and the Organization of American States agreed to
strengthen the office of the Rapporteur on the Rights of Child), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2001eng/chap.2.htm (last visited Jan. 21,
2003).
175. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, para. 2,
available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Relatoria/English/AnnualReports/AROO/Introduction2000
.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
176. See, e.g., The Human Rights of all Migrant Workers and Their Families,
AG/RES. 1775 (XXXI-O/0 1), available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/gaO/agres1775.htm (last visited Jan. 21,
2003); Human Rights Defenders in the Americas: Support for the Individuals,
Groups, and Organizations of Civil Society Working to Promote and Protect
Human Rights in the Americas, AG/RES. 1818 (XXXI-O/01), available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga0l/agres1818.htm (last visited Jan. 21,
2003).
177. Legal Bases, Functions and Activities of the IACHR During 2001, supra
note 174, para. 36.
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The Commission continued its strong work in the area of
indigenous rights as well. In late 2000, the Commission published a
report on the situation of indigenous peoples in the Americas.'78 In
March of 2001, it published a comprehensive set of authorities and
precedents in international law for the long-pending American
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 7 9
Finally, in 2001, the Commission continued its focus on human
rights in specific countries of the Americas, publishing its fifth report
on Guatemala and its third report on Paraguay. In both its 2000 and
2001 Annual Reports, the Commission documented developments on
human rights in Colombia and Cuba, and in the 2000 Annual Report,
it followed up on its own recommendations to the governments of
the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Peru.
This section begins with a review of cases on women's rights and
the death penalty during the period under review, followed by human
rights issues in the United States following September 11, 2001.
Cases reflecting the development of the human rights situation in
Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru follow. Finally, there is a brief
discussion of other cases presenting novel issues, followed by a short
preview of cases that have been admitted for the Commission's
consideration in the future.
B. CASES INTERPRETING WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM
Governments often justify gender distinctions based on cultural
difference. In the case of Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra v.
Guatemala, a former deputy ombudswoman and Guatemalan
attorney, challenged articles of the Guatemalan Civil Code as
discriminatory and violative of the right to family (Article 17) and to
178. The Human Rights Situation of the Indigenous People in the Americas,
OEA/Ser./L/V/II. 108 Doc.62 (2000), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Indigenas/TOC.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
179. Authorities and Precedents in International and Domestic Law for the
Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
OEA/Ser./LiV/IJ. 110 Doc. 22 (2001), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Indigenas/Indigenas.en.01/index.htm (last visited Jan. 21,
2003).
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equal protection (Article 24).18 ° Guatemala defended cultural
relativism poorly and failed to prevail. The Commission upheld a
challenge in support of the legal recognition of women's capacity to
develop socially, economically, and politically in Guatemalan
society. "'1
The report, issued in January 2001, references an earlier decision
on related issues and notes that Guatemala complied with many of
the previous recommendations through the enactment of legislative
reforms. At the same time the Commission urged that Guatemala
fulfill the remaining recommendations.
The challenged provisions of Guatemalan law established
distinctions based on gender which restricted the ability of women to
represent the marital union, and gave almost exclusive power to the
husbands for administering marital property. Other provisions
"confer[red] upon the wife the special 'right and obligation' to care
for minor children and the home," and restricted married women's
right to "exercise a profession or maintain employment where it does
not prejudice her role as a mother and homemaker."' 8 2 In addition,
the law permitted a husband to prohibit his wife "from realizing
activities outside the home, as long as he provides for her and has
justified reasons."' 83 Other provisions gave primary responsibility to
the husband for representing their children and administering their
property, and permitted that "by virtue of her sex, a woman may be
excused from exercising certain forms of guardianship."'18 4
The Guatemalan Supreme Court upheld these provisions, despite
its recognition that the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
180. Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Report No.
28/98, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L/V/II. 95 doc.7 rev. at 144 (1997) (noting that
the Commission required a concrete victim for the case processing, whereupon the
petitioner lent her name to the action), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/Chapterlll/Merits/Guatemalal 1.625.ht
m (last visited Jan. 21, 2003). Prior to that time, the petition had been brought as a
general matter, by the Center for Justice in International Law (CEJIL).
181. Id. para. 45.
182. Id. para. 2.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW") 8 5 formed part of
Guatemalan national law. The judges held that the provisions
appropriately "provided for judicial certainty in the allocation of
roles within the marriage."'8 6
The petitioner disputed those arguments, asserting that the
relationship between the objective sought and the means employed
were disproportionate and, indeed, violated the rights to equal
protection and family under the American Convention on Human
Rights. The victim claimed that although her husband had not
enforced any of the prerogatives the law afforded him, she was,
nevertheless, adversely affected. As a working mother, wife, and the
co-owner of joint marital property, those provisions of the Civil
Code applied to her. Just as the State of Chile argued before the
Court in The Last Temptation of Christ Case, the Guatemala
Government communicated its acknowledgment of the inconsistency
between the code provisions and both national and international legal
obligations, but stated that the executive was unable to contravene
the determination of the nation's highest court.
The Commission's analysis employed CEDAW's definition of
discrimination and pointed out that it was more complete than prior
understandings of discriminatory behavior. The definition of
discrimination under CEDAW includes:
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which
has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on
the basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social and cultural, civil
or any other field.1 87
The movement in support of equality for women has long
recognized that many domestic laws purporting to protect women in
fact limit their opportunities to act as full members of society.
185. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No. 8289,
1249 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter CEDAW], available at
http://193.194.138.190/html/menu3/b/eIcedaw.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
186. Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra, Case 11.625, paras. 3, 34.
187. CEDAW, supra note 185, art. I (emphasis added).
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CEDAW's definition of discrimination takes that reality into account
when it includes not only gender restrictions or exclusions, but all
types of distinctions based on gender. The Commission concluded
that, "the overarching effect of the challenged provisions is to deny
married women legal autonomy." '188
The Commission also noted that courts have upheld "the gender-
based distinctions under study as a matter of domestic law essentially
on the basis of the need for certainty and juridical security, the need
to protect the marital home and children, respect for traditional
Guatemalan values, and in certain cases, the need to protect women
in their capacity as wives and mothers."' 8 9 However, the Commission
observed that Guatemala's Constitutional Court "made no effort to
probe the validity of the assertions or to weigh alternative positions,
and the Commission is not persuaded that the distinctions cited are
even consistent with the aims articulated."' 190 Thus, the Commission
found that the gender-based distinctions were neither proportional
nor reasonably justifiable, resulting in a violation of petitioner's
rights under the American Convention.
The Commission found violations of Article 1(1) (obligation to
respect and ensure rights), Article 2 (obligation to enact legal
protection measures), Article 24 (equal protection), and Article
17(4) 191 of the American Convention, "read with reference to the
requirements Article 16(1)" of CEDAW. 92 The Commission also
found that right to privacy under Article 11 was implicated because
the code provisions unduly restricted the individual right to "pursue
the development of one's personality and aspirations, determine
188. Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra, Case 11.625, para. 38.
189. Id. para. 37.
190. Id.
191. See American Convention, supra note 13, art. 17(4) ("The States Parties
shall take appropriate steps to ensure the equality of rights and the adequate
balancing of responsibilities of the spouses as to marriage, during marriage and in
the event of its dissolution.").
192. Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra, Case 11.625, para. 45; see also
CEDAW, supra note 185, art. 16 (1) (mandating that states shall "take all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations").
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one's identity, and define one's personal relationships."'93 The
Commission noted that, "married women such as [the petitioner] are
continuously impeded by the fact that the law does not recognize
them as having legal status equivalent to that enjoyed by other
citizens."'194
Guatemala exchanged a series of communications with the
Commission purporting to demonstrate its compliance with the
Commission's recommendations. 95 However, the Commission noted
that Guatemala had not yet remedied some discriminatory
provisions, including the chapeau of one of the articles of the
domestic legislation that refers "to the duty of the husband to protect
and assist his wife within the marriage" without imposing a similar
condition on the wife and a provision that excludes women from
guardianship responsibilities.'96 The Commission noted that the duty
to protect and assist "is consistent with the nature of the marital
relationship," and it should not be implied as being the sole duty of
the husband. With regard to the special relief from guardianship
duties for women, the Commission asserted that it is irrelevant if it is
seen as an obligation or a privilege. It is, nevertheless, discriminatory
based on conceptions of gender that presume women are inherently
weak or incapable. 197
Two other cases illustrating patterns of discrimination against
women reveal the prejudices associated with gender-based violence
and the consequences they generate. The first relates to domestic
violence in Brazil. The second involves the illegal detention, rape,
and torture of three Tzeltal sisters by soldiers in the Mexican State of
Chiapas.
In the case of Maria Da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil,'98 the
victim charged that Brazil had, for years, condoned the domestic
193. Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra, Case 11.625, para. 46.
194. Id. para. 48.
195. Id. para. 57-76.
196. Id. paras. 79-80.
197. Id. paras. 81-82.
198. Maria Da Penha Maia Femandes v. Brazil, Case 12.05 1, Report No. 54/01,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 111 Doc. 20 rev. at 704 (2000), available at
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violence she suffered at the hands of her husband. She was the victim
of a 1983 murder attempt by her former husband, which left her
paraplegic, and with numerous additional medical ailments. Her
complaint is based on the failure to finalize any judgment against her
ex-husband fifteens years after he shot and nearly killed her.
Consequently, she alleged violations of Articles 1(1), 8, 24 and 25 of
the American Convention; Articles 3, 4(a)-(g), 5 and 7 of the Inter-
American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence Against Women, ("Bel~m do Pard
Convention"); 99 and articles of the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man 00 ("American Declaration").2 1 The
Commission found violations of Articles 1(1) (obligation to protect
rights), 8 (fair trial), and 25 (judicial remedy), and violations of
Article 7 of the Belkm do Pari Convention, insofar as Article 7
obligates the State to protect the rights contemplated in Articles 3
and 4(a)-(g) of that instrument.2  The Commission also concluded
that Brazil violated Articles II (right to equality) and XVII (right to
recognition of juridical personality and civil rights) of the American
Declaration.203
The Commission's analysis focuses on both the underlying act and
the judicial proceedings, despite the fact that the assault occurred in
1983, before Brazil was party to the American Convention. 20 4 The
record reflects that the Brazilian justice authorities demonstrated a
patent reluctance to punish the petitioner's husband for attempted
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/Chapterlll/Merits/Brazil 12.051 .htm
(last visited Jan. 22, 2003).
199. Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication
of Violence Against Women, entered into force Mar. 5, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1534
(1994) [hereinafter Belrm do Pard Convention], available at
http://www.oas.org/cim/English/Convention%20Violence%20Against%20Women
.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2003).
200. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. RES. XXX,
OEA/Ser.L.V/II. 82 Doc. Rev. I at 17 (1992), available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga-res98/eres1591.htm (last visited Jan. 22,
2003).
201. Maria Da Penha Maia Ferndndez, Case 12.051, para. 2.
202. Id. para. 60.
203. Id.
204. See id. para. 60 (indicating that Brazil ratified the American Convention in
1992).
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murder, even though there was more than sufficient evidence. In
determining admissibility, the Commission found that the obligations
to protect rights under the American Convention and Bel~m do Pardi
Convention" 5 are of a continuous nature. Therefore, the violations
persist in time, despite the fact that Brazil's adherence to those
Conventions occurs well after the underlying acts.
The victim was shot while she was asleep. There was a history of
previous violent assaults by her husband, and he tried to persuade her
to declare him the beneficiary of her life insurance policy one week
before the shooting. The prosecutors proved that he lied on several
occasions as to the circumstances of the assault, including his
assertion that thieves perpetrated the crime. Also, there were witness
statements implicating him in the crime.
A guilty verdict eight years after the fact resulted in a fifteen-year
sentence that was reduced to ten years on appeal. The Commission
noted that the eight-year delay alone in obtaining the first conviction
constituted a denial of rights under Articles 8 and 25 and the
obligations under Article 1(1). Three years later, a court overturned
the guilty verdict based on a time-barred challenge alleging faulty
jury instructions. At a subsequent trial, in 1996, the defendant was
again sentenced, this time to a ten-year and six-month prison term.
His appeal from that conviction has been pending since April 1997;
thus, the conviction was not final when the Commission decided the
case.
The petitioner asserted that the circumstances of this case, and the
general pattern of impunity in cases of domestic violence in Brazil,
demonstrate the State's systematic failure to take effective measures
to prevent and punish this type of violence that disproportionately
affects women. The Commission's finding that the State violated its
duties to prevent, punish, and eradicate violence against women
under the Bel6m do Pardi Convention is based on an analysis of the
facts that discerns a "general pattern of negligence and lack of
effective action by the State in prosecuting and convicting
aggressors. 2 °6  The Commission based this finding on the
circumstances relating to the assault on the petitioner, national
205. See id. (noting that Brazil ratified the Bel6m do ParA Convention in 1995).
206. Maria Da Penha Maia Ferndndez, Case 12.05 1, para 56.
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statistics concerning violence against women, and the State's
lethargic response to that violence. 207 The factual information
confirming a pattern of State tolerance of violence against women
also supported findings of the violation of the equal protection
provisions of the American Declaration and American Convention.
The Commission's analysis corresponds here to a definition of
violence against women "condoned by the state or its agents
regardless of where it occurs."208
The final recommendations refer to the obligation of the State to
provide a civil remedy to victims. A recommendation is also made to
train justice-sector functionaries, and the public as a whole, on how
to respond to cases of violence against women, and to establish more
fluid mechanisms for preventing, investigating, prosecuting, and
punishing such crimes.
In the case of Ana, Beatriz, and Cecilia Gonzalez Perez v.
Mexico, 09 soldiers gang raped three Tzeltal indigenous women and
subjected them to other torture. In 1994, the victims were illegally
detained and questioned in a language they did not speak at a
military checkpoint.210 This assault occurred in the Mexican State of
Chiapas, four months after the armed rebellion by the Ejercito
Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional began there. The military courts
definitively closed the investigation in 1996, citing a lack of
evidence. Despite the influence of both racist and political
perspectives in this case, it is included in this section concerning
women's rights for two reasons: first, the Commission reiterated in
clear terms its analysis of rape as a form of torture; and secondly, the
207. See id. paras. 45-49 (citing studies indicating the high number of domestic
attacks on women in Brazil and the disproportionate number of women victims).
Seventy percent of criminal complaints relating to domestic violence are put on
hold with no conclusion being reached, and only two percent of the complaints
result in a conviction. Id. Brazil repealed the "honor defense" justification for wife
killing only a decade ago, in 1991, although the defense was still asserted without
judicial censure at trial. Id. para. 47.
208. Bel~m do Pardi Convention, supra note 199, art. 2.
209. Ana, Beatriz, and Cecilia Gonzalez Perez v. Mexico, Case 11.565, Report
No. 53/01, OEA/ser.L/V/I1.111 doc. 20 rev. at 1097 (2000), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/women/Mexicol 1.565eng.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
210. See id. para. 31 (noting that the victims' statement revealed that they did
not speak Spanish and only understood the language to a very limited extent).
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State's response to the allegations demonstrated a subtle bias that
prevents the crime of rape from being accurately understood for what
it is - the assertion of power through an act of violence.
Despite a detailed report by a medical doctor showing physical
evidence of the gang rape and offering detailed testimony by the
victims, the State asserted that the intention of the petitioners was to
mislead the Commission and denied that the alleged events actually
occurred. 2 1 The State claimed that military checkpoints for purposes
of public security were permitted under the Mexican Constitution
and that the accusations were an offense to the honor of the armed
forces. The State pointed to both the military court's investigation
and the failure of the victims to re-submit to a gynecological
examination by the State's experts as evidence of the falsity of the
claim. In short, the State's defense related essentially to its
comparative estimation of the character of the accusers and the
accused.
Much of the evidence the victims presented to the civilian justice
authorities and later transferred to the military courts is reproduced in
the Commission's report. The testimony gives compelling and
detailed accounts of the entire incident, including the detention, gang
rape and intimidation, including accusations that the three young
victims were supporters of the insurgent indigenous group in the
region. Furthermore, a medical report of a gynecological
examination carried out according to guidelines contained in the
United Nations Principles on the Effective Investigation and
Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment substantiated the testimony.
The Commission concluded that the Public Prosecutor for Military
Justice "completely ignored the evidence submitted by victims and
proceeded to order another gynecological examination for them. 212
That request came a substantial time after the incident had occurred,
although the Commission qualified the initial medical examination
conducted twenty days after the incident, and the Mexican civilian
courts ratified it. Furthermore, the report of the medical examination
documented the fear and anguish that these young women had
211. Id. para. 21.
212. Id. para. 69.
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already suffered upon experiencing a gynecological examination for
the first time, under these circumstances. The government's assertion
that the victims would have to submit to another such examination
was truly a second attempt to victimize them.
In this connection, the attitude of the military justice authorities, as
represented by the State, is notably preoccupied with the honor of the
military and its mission. The Commission noted that:
The State maintains that: it is incomprehensible that accusations would be
leveled against institutions that are in good standing and enjoy a good
reputation such as the Mexican Army, without any evidence other than
rumors that merely create insecurity from a legal standpoint and are a
most shameful attack against the institutions responsible for National
Security, which were moved to the conflict zone for the sole purpose of
fulfilling their duty, that is, their constitutional mission of protecting the
internal security of the Nation, within a system based on a rule of law and
respect for human rights such as exists in Mexico.
213
The State based its insistence that the charges were an attempt to
impugn the honor of the Mexican armed forces on the denials of the
accused and the statements of persons living in the area where the
checkpoint was located. Those civilian declarations gave general
observations concerning the behavior of the soldiers and asserted that
they had never seen members of the military mistreat girls, nor had
they heard any rumors to that effect. If the allegations were truthful,
the State argued, the victims would have no problems resubmitting to
a second medical exam. The report of the military authorities also
ridiculed the petitioners' "alleged" attorney, characterizing her
behavior as "haughty and intimidating."214
Rather than conduct a serious investigation, the State used the case
as a staging ground for discrediting the Zapatista National Liberation
Army ("EZLN") and those who the State suspected were its
sympathizers. At the same time, the State ignored the evidence and
the consequences of what these three young women had suffered."5
213. Id. para. 21, n.14.
214. Id. para. 66.
215. See Ctr. for Justice & Int'l Law, Ann. Rep. (2001), at 104 (stating that
presently, representatives of the Mexican Government and the petitioners are
engaged in discussions regarding compliance with the Commission's
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The Commission "establishe[d] that, as a result of the humiliation
created by this abuse, [as perceived by the community they lived in]
the Gonzalez Perez sisters and their mother had to flee their habitual
residence and their community."'2 16
On the issue of fair trial and judicial remedy, the Commission
determined that an investigation and trial in the military justice
system of a case concerning criminal conduct against civilians is
inconsistent with a democratic rule of law. It also reiterated its own
previous findings that "military courts do not meet the requirements
of independence and impartiality imposed under Article 8(1) of the
American Convention. 217  It also reiterated findings and
recommendations of the United Nations Special Rapporteur for
Torture with regard to Mexico, 2 8 asserting that the pattern of
impunity for torture committed by the Mexican military required that
all alleged infractions involving personnel from that institution be
tried in civilian courts, even those arising in the discharge of their
official duties.21 9
The Commission went on to cite the Bel~m do Pard Convention,
the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish the Crime of
Torture, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women,22° the decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for




(last visited Jan. 22, 2003).
216. Ana, Beatriz, and Cecilia Gonzalez Perez, Case 11.565, para. 42.
217. Id. para. 81.
218. Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of
Detention or Prison, in Particular, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment: Report of Special Rapporteur Nigel Rodley, submitted
pursuant to of Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1997/38,
E/CN.4/1998/38/Add.2, Jan. 14, 1998, available at
http://www.hri.ca/fortherecordl 998/documentation/commission/e-cn4-1998-38-
add2.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
219. Ana, Beatriz, and Cecilia Gonzalez Perez, Case 11.565, para. 79.
220. Radhika Coomaraswamy, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women, Including Its Causes and Consequences, submitted in accordance
with Commission resolution 1997/44, E/CN.4/1998/54, Jan. 26, 1998, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/c90326ab6dbc2af4c 125
661 e0048710e?Opendocument (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
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the Former Yugoslavia, and its own jurisprudence to reaffirm that
rape is a form of violence prohibited under international law.
Moreover, the Commissioners concluded that the rapes committed in
this case were acts of torture because the assault took place, "as part
of an illegal interrogation conducted by military officers in a zone of
armed conflict, and [during which they] were accused of
collaborating with the EZLN. '' 221 Finally, the Commission noted that:
Perhaps more than the honour of the victim, it is the perceived honour of
the enemy that is targeted in the perpetration of sexual violence against
women; it is seen and often experienced as a means of humiliating the
opposition. Sexual violence against women is meant to demonstrate
victory over the men of the other group who have failed to protect their
women. It is a message of castration and emasculation. It is a battle of
men fought over the bodies of women.
222
The Commission found violations of the petitioners' rights under
Article 5 (right to humane treatment) and Article 11(2) (right to
privacy). It also found that the mother of the three victims suffered
inhumane treatment because she had to "stand by helplessly and
witness the abuse of her three daughters by members of the Mexican
Armed Forces and then to experience, along with them, ostracism by
her community. '223 With regard to the sixteen-year old victim, the
Commission found that there was a violation of the rights of the child
under the American Convention. 224 The Commission also recognized
violations of Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention, and
Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture, 5 with regard to the failure to investigate, prosecute,
and punish the perpetrators. Furthermore, the Commission reiterated
its recommendation to carry out "a complete, impartial and effective
221. Ana, Beatriz, and Cecilia Gonzalez Perez, Case 11.565, para. 51.
222. Id. para. 51, n. 26.
223. Id. para. 53.
224. See id. paras. 55-61 (discussing the violation of the rights of the child
protected under Article 19 of the American Convention).
225. Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, O.A.S. Treaty
Series No. 67, entered into force Feb. 28, 1987, reprinted in Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/ser.L/V/II.82
doc.6 rev. at 83(1992), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/a-
51 html (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
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investigation within the regular criminal courts in Mexico," and
unequivocally declared that their recommendation would in no way
be satisfied by re-opening a military investigation into the case, as
Mexico had suggested in a communication dated October 2000.226
C. DECISIONS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND RELATED ISSUES
Cases involving the death penalty and procedural aspects of its
administration assumed a high profile in the Commission's
contentious jurisprudence during 2001 and 2002, including its
referral of the case against Trinidad and Tobago, Hilaire et al., to the
Court, as discussed above. All of the capital punishment cases arose
in the United States and four countries of the English-speaking
Caribbean region: the Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and
Grenada. In all, the Commission decided six cases on the merits," 7
226. See Ana, Beatriz, and Cecilia Gonzalez Perez, Case 11.565, paras. 78-82
(discussing the inappropriateness of military jurisdiction to judge facts in the
present case). The Commission also noted that one of its previous reports on the
Situation of Human Rights in Mexico cited that impunity for torture was
"commonplace," and that it is often used "during preventive detention and
preliminary investigation phases, as a way of obtaining confessions and/or
intimidation." Id. para. 87.
227. Michael Edwards et al. v. The Bahamas, Cases 12.067, 12.068, 12.086,
Report No.48/01, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L/V/II.I 11 doc. 20 rev. at 603 (Apr.
4, 2001), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/Chapterlll/Merits/Bahamas 1 2.067.ht
m (last visited Jan. 23, 2003); Juan Raul Garza v. United States, Case 12.243,
Report No. 52/01, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.LiV/II.111 doc. 20 rev. at 1255
(Apr. 4, 2001), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/ChapterIII/Merits/USA 12.243.htm
(last visited Jan. 23, 2003); Donnason Knights v. Grenada, Cases 12.028, Report
No.47/01, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L/V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. at 841 (Apr. 4,
2001), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/Chapterlll/Merits/Grenada12.028.htm
(last visited Jan. 23, 2003); Leroy Lamey et al. v. Jamaica, Case 11.826, 11.843,
11.846, Report No. 49/01, Inter-Am C.H.R., OEA/ser.L/V/II. 111 doc. 20 rev. at
996 (Apr. 4, 2001), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/Chapterlll/Merits/Jamaica. 11.826.htm
(last visited Jan. 23, 2003); Joseph Thomas v. Jamaica, Case 12.183, Report
No.127/01, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser./LiV/II.114 doc. 5 rev. (Dec. 3, 2001),
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/127-01.html (last visited Jan.
23, 2003); Michael Domingues v. United States, Report No. 62/02, Case 12.285
(Oct. 22, 2002), available at
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three cases on admissibility,228 and at least twenty-four new cases
involving requests for the issuance of precautionary measures.2 29
This section explores some of the common and unique themes in
those cases.
All of the Commission's decisions now share the common
articulation of the "heightened scrutiny" standard for review of
capital cases, which requires international human rights bodies to
take a "restrictive approach" in its review of cases involving the
imposition of the death penalty.23 ° The Caribbean decisions on the
merits all share virtually identical issues and resolution. First, the
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2002eng/USA.12285.htm (last visited Jan. 23,
2003).
228. Gary T. Graham (Shaka Sankofa) v. United States, Case 11.193, Report
No. 51/00, OEA/ser.L/V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. at 387 (June 15, 2000), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/Chapterlll/Admissible/USA 11.193.ht
m (last visited Jan. 23, 2003); Ramon Martinez-Villareal v. United States, Case
11.753, Report No. 108/00, OEA/ser.L/V/II. 111 doc. 20 rev. at 409 (Dec. 4, 2000),
available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/Chapterlll/Admissible/USA 11.753.ht
m (last visited Jan. 23, 2003); Balkissoon Roodal v. Trinidad and Tobago, Case
12.147, Report No. 89/01, OEA/ser./L/V/1I.114 doc. 5 rev. (Oct. 10, 2001),
available at http://wwwl.umn.eduihumanrts/cases/89-01.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2003).
229. See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-Am. C.H.R, art. 25 (stating that the
Commission is permitted to issue precautionary measures in "serious and urgent
cases" in order to "prevent irreparable harm to persons"); see also Ann. Rep. of the
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 2000, Vol. 1, OEA/ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. 16 (Apr. 16,
2001) (stating the Commission sought precautionary measures in two capital cases
from Grenada (Rudolph Baptiste and Donnason Knights), two cases from Jamaica
(Denton Aitken and Dave Sewell), two cases from Trinidad and Tobago (Bakisson
Roodal and Sheldon Roach), and ten cases from the United States (Douglas
Christopher Thomas, Juan Raul Garza, Shaka Sankofa, Victor Saldaho, Michael
Domingues, Miguel Angel Flores, Johnny Paul Penry, James Winston Chambers,
Alexander Williams, and Jose Jacobo Amaya Ruiz),- Ann. Rep. of the Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 2001, Vol. 1, OEA/ser.L/V/11. 114, doc. 5 rev. 1 (16 April 2002), at 77, 83-
84, 84-85 (discussing how the Commission sought precautionary measures in one
capital case from Guyana (Daniel and Cornell Vaux), four capital cases from
Trinidad and Tobago (Arnold Ramlogan, Beemal Ramnarace, Takoor Ramcharan,
and Alladin Mohamed), and three cases from the United States (Thomas Nevius,
Robert Bacon Jr., and Gerardo Valdez Maltos); James Rexford Powell v. United
States, Precautionary Measures issued on September 19, 2002 (on file with the
authors); Javier Suarez-Medina v. United States, Precautionary Measures issued on
July 29, 2002 (on file with the authors).
230. E.g., Edwards et al., Cases 12.067, 12.068, 12.086, para. 110.
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cases all raise the question of the mandatory application of the death
penalty and the absence of individualized sentencing which the
Commission held, in each case, to constitute not only a violation of
the right to life in Article 4 of the American Convention, but also a
violation of Article 5 (protection against cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment or treatment) and Article 8 (right to a fair trial). 2 3
Second, the cases all concluded that the absence of an adequate
system for the exercise of mercy in capital cases through pardon,
commutation, or amnesty, violates the explicit terms of Article 4(6)
of the American Convention. The Commission also rejected
governments' assertions that commutation powers exercised by the
executive infused the review of death sentences with a sufficient
element of discretion to permit the initial automatic death sentence
for murder. 32 Finally, all petitioners prevailed on the question of the
adequacy of the conditions of confinement on death row while
awaiting execution, which were found to violate Article 5 of the
American Convention. 233
The Commission's jurisprudence has become increasingly
synergistic with that of national reviewing courts in the death penalty
area, at least as related to the Caribbean. On March 11, 2002, Great
Britain's Privy Council roundly endorsed the Commission's analysis
in a series of decisions striking down the mandatory death penalty in
Belize, Saint Lucia, Saint Christopher, and Nevis. 234 In reaching its
decision, the Privy Council, in addition to its strong reliance on the
Commission, relied upon relevant jurisprudence from South Africa,
the United States, India, Canada, England, the Human Rights
231. Cf id., paras. 124-54 (stating that the Commission performed the same
analysis and reached the same conclusions under the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man because the Bahamas is not a party to the American
Convention).
232. Id. para. 168; Knights, Cases 12.028, para. 105; Lamey et al., Case 11.826,
11.843, 11.846, para. 166; Thomas, Cases 12.028, para. 120.
233. Knights, Cases 12.028, para. 129; Lamey et al., Case 11.826, 11.843,
11.846, para. 202; Thomas, Cases 12.028, para. 135.
234. Reyes v. The Queen [2002] 2 A.C. 235, 254-55 (Belize), available at
http://www.ijchr.com/Patrick%20Reyes%20v%20the%20Queen.htm (last visited
Jan. 23, 2003); see also Regina v. Hughes [2002] 2 A.C. 259 (Saint Lucia); Fox v.
The Queen [2002] 2 A.C. 284 (Saint Christopher and Nevis); Alex Bailin, The
Inhumanity of Mandatory Sentences, CRIM. L. REV. 641 (2002).
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Committee, and the European Court of Human Rights.235 This
reliance on international and comparative sources contrasts sharply
with that of the United States Supreme Court in its own death penalty
jurisprudence.236
In the Jamaican cases, delay in bringing the accused before a judge
after arrest, and in the length of time from arrest to trial, gave rise to
violations of Articles 7(5) and 8(1) of the American Convention.237
In the Thomas case, the Commission also found a violation of the
right to a fair trial, protected by Article 8 of the American
Convention, when the trial judge demonstrated bias in an instruction
to the jury regarding his belief in the defendant's guilt. 38 Due to its
disposition of the cases on other grounds, the Commission declined
to reach the issue of prolonged post-conviction detention in the
Bahamas cases,"' nor did it address an allegation that Jamaica's
method of execution by hanging constitutes a violation of Article
5(2) of the American Convention.24 °
Flaws in the provision of counsel, which was available only
through legal aid to legally indigent defendants in the cases under
consideration, gave rise to a number of violations. The unavailability
of legal aid for constitutional motions played a part in two of the
Caribbean decisions, giving rise to violations of Article 25.241 In
Lamey, the Commission found that undue delay in providing access
to legal aid gave rise to violations of Articles 8(2)(d) and (e). 242 On
the other hand, in two cases, the Commission rejected the claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. In Edwards et al., the petitioners
raised issues about domestic defense counsel's failure to raise claims
of prejudicial publicity during trial, coerced confessions, inhumane
235. See Reyes, 2 A.C. at 248-56.
236. Richard J. Wilson, The Influence of International Law and Practice on the
Death Penalty in the United States, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed., forthcoming 2003).
237. Lamey et al., Case 11.826, 11.843, 11.846, paras. 178, 188.
238. Thomas, Case 12.183, paras. 138, 144.
239. Edwards et al., Cases 12.067, 12.068, 12.086, para. 225.
240. Thomas, Case 12.183, para. 136.
241. Knights, Case 12.183, para. 136; Lamey et al., Case 11.826, 11.843,
11.846, paras. 225-26.
242. Id. para. 215.
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treatment by the police, and failure to call a medical doctor to attest
to the mistreatment. The Commission concluded that those issues
"are more appropriately left to the domestic courts." '243 The issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate viable
defenses, raised in Lamey, gave rise to the only finding of no
violation by the Commission where the claim had not been
adequately preserved in the domestic legal system.24 In two U.S.
cases in which the petitions were found to be admissible, claims of
ineffective assistance of court-assigned counsel will be reviewed by
the Commission in the merits stage.245
The Roodal decision on admissibility is the first published case
against Trinidad and Tobago since its denunciation of the American
Convention. As such, the petitioner's lawyers grounded their claims
on violations of the American Declaration rather than the American
Convention. 246 The Commission accepted jurisdiction of the case and
agreed to its admissibility based on violations of the Declaration,
having reached a similar conclusion some time ago as to the United
States, which is also a non-State-party to the Convention but, like
Trinidad, is a member of the OAS. 247 Nonetheless, the Commission
added potential violations of the Convention for its future
consideration of the merits, given the fact that some of the
misconduct alleged arose before the effective date of Trinidad's
denunciation.2 48
The U.S. cases also presented some common themes. Two of the
cases present questions as to the application of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations to foreign nationals on death row
in the United States. Under that treaty, detaining officials are
required to promptly inform a detained foreign national of the right
to contact his home country's consulate, and, if the detainee so
requests, to promptly notify consular officials of the detention. In
243. Edwards et al., Cases 12.067, 12.068, 12.086, paras. 208-15.
244. Lamey et al., Case 11.826, 11.843, 11.846, para. 217.
245. Graham, Case 11.193, paras. 58-59; Martinez- Villareal, Case 11.753, para.
64.
246. Roodal, Case 12.147, para. 2.
247. Id. para. 24.
248. Id. para. 25.
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both of the cases pending before the Commission, the individual
petitioners are Mexican nationals. 249 In Mr. Suarez-Medina's case,
his execution proceeded after the issuance by the Commission of
precautionary measures on his behalf, thus giving rise to oral
arguments before the Commission in its October 2002 regular
session as to whether precautionary measures the Commission issued
are legally binding as a matter of international law.
Another issue common to two cases before the Commission is that
of the execution of juveniles who were below eighteen at the time the
alleged offense was committed. In its admissibility decision in
Graham (Shaka Sankofa), the Commission signaled that it would
again take up the question of the legitimacy of the juvenile death
penalty in international human rights law.Y50 Despite repeated
requests to the government of the United States and the State of
Texas for precautionary measures, the State of Texas executed Mr.
Sankofa on June 22, 2000. The case is still pending before the
Commission on the merits.
On October 22, 2002, the Commission decided the question of the
legitimacy of the juvenile death penalty under international law in
Michael Domingues v. United States. That case had already
undergone extensive domestic consideration in the U.S. courts,
culminating in the denial of review by the United States Supreme
Court of a decision of the Nevada Supreme Court. The state court
was deeply divided over the question of the application of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provisions
prohibiting the execution of persons under eighteen at the time of
their alleged crimes, but upheld the conviction.' The Commission
found that the imposition of the death penalty on children under
eighteen at the time of their conduct violates both customary
international law andjus cogens norms.252 To justify this conclusion,
249. Martinez-Villareal, Case 11.753, para. 69.
250. Graham, Case 11.193, para. 60.
251. Domingues v. Nevada, 114 Nev. 783, 961 P.2d 1279 (1998), cert. denied
528 U.S. 963 (1999).
252. Domingues, Case No. 12.285, para. 84-85.
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the Commission exhaustively reviewed international law and
standards, as well as the law and practice of nations.25 3
Curiously, the United States, unlike its engagement with other
death penalty issues before the Commission, failed to express its
views at all in this litigation until after the Commission had issued an
initial report unfavorable to the government. 4 After the Commission
issued the report, the government apparently filed an extensive
pleading urging the Commission to "withdraw" its report, combined
with "supplemental observations. '255 The Commission rejected the
government's assertions, explicitly finding that the United States
could not legitimately claim to be a persistent objector to the norm
barring the execution of juveniles.5 6 The issue of the validity of the
juvenile death penalty already has narrowly missed review by the
U.S. Supreme Court on two occasions in 2002, in Patterson v. Texas
257 and In re Stanford.258 If and when the question reaches the
Supreme Court, the potential influence of the Commission's decision
in Domingues cannot be overstated.
The U.S. Supreme Court is not likely to review the other issue
common to two cases before the Commission. In Graham and
Martinez- Villareal, the Commission will again address the issue of
the "death row phenomenon," whereby the petitioner alleges that the
prolonged wait for execution in death row conditions can itself
constitute cruel, infamous or unusual punishment under Article
253. Id. paras. 40-83.
254. Id. paras. 26, 89.
255. Id. para. 90.
256. Id. paras. 85, 102.
257. See Patterson v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 24 (2002) (Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that it would be appropriate for the Court to revisit
the issue regarding the execution for the crimes committed when the offender is
below the age of eighteen in light of the "apparent consensus that exists among the
States and in the international community" as to the impropriety of the death
penalty for juveniles).
258. See In re Stanford, 123 S. Ct. 472 (2002) (Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and
Bryer, JJ., dissenting) (dissenting from the denial of a petition for writ of habeas
corpus asking to stay the execution because the defendant was a juvenile at the
time of his crimes).
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XXVI of the American Declaration.259 The U.S. Supreme Court
again rejected that issue in the Fall 2002 term, over only one dissent,
in a case involving a Florida death row inmate who has spent twenty-
seven years awaiting execution.26°
In Juan Raul Garza v. United States,261 the Commission found
violations of Articles XVIII (Right to a Fair Trial) and XXVI (Right
to Due Process of Law) of the American Declaration when the
sentencing jury in Texas heard evidence of four unadjudicated
murders in Mexico. 262 Although the Commission recommended
commutation, the government went ahead with Garza's execution on
June 19, 2001. The execution followed that of Timothy McVeigh by
one week, making it the second federal execution after a delay in
application of the federal death penalty for over thirty-five years.
Despite the petitioner's argument that federal inaction on the death
penalty over that long a time was a de facto abolition of the death
penalty, the Commission rejected that argument as a basis for
violation of Article I (right to life) of the Declaration.263 One
Commissioner, Helio Bicudo from Brazil, expressed his view that
the death penalty had been abolished through the evolution of the
practice of the Inter-American system.
When it deals with the issues on the merits, the Commission will
also grapple in the Sankofa case with questions of violations of the
rights to fair trial and due process (Articles XVIII and XXVI of the
Declaration, respectively) because Mr. Sankofa was procedurally
barred from producing strong evidence of his actual innocence of the
crimes for which the court convicted him.264 These same provisions
259. Graham, Case 11.193, paras. 60, 65; Martinez Villareal, Case 11.753, para.
70.
260. See Foster v. Florida, 123 S. Ct. 470, 471 (2002) (Bryer, JJ., dissenting)
(stating that the Court should review the case on the grounds that having a person
on death row wait for twenty-seven years before the execution may constitute
"cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited under the Constitution).
261. Juan Raul Garza v. United States, Case No.12,243, Report No. 52/01,
OEA!Ser.L/V/II. 111 Doc. 20 rev. at 1255 (2000), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/ChapterIII/Merits/USA12.243.htm#_f
tnrefl (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
262. Id. paras. 102-110.
263. Id. paras. 94-95.
264. Id. paras. 58-59.
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will come into play in Martinez-Villareal, where the Commission
will decide the effects of mental illness amounting to incompetence
to stand trial or to be executed.265 In both cases, the issues mentioned
here are closely related to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
mentioned above.
Finally, the Commission has increased pressure on all the OAS
countries to honor its issuance of precautionary measures in all cases,
but particularly in capital punishment cases where execution is
imminent. It has expressed its displeasure with failure by the U.S.
government to take precautionary measures in stronger and stronger
terms, including its stern rebuke to the United States in Garza, where
it found that the government's failure to honor such requests
"undermined" the Commission's ability to investigate and
"effectively deprives condemned prisoners of their right to petition in
the inter-American human rights system." '266 In one hearing before
the Commission at its October 2002 regular session of meetings, the
Commission heard arguments from the parties in Suarez-Medina v.
United States as to whether the Commission's precautionary
measures had binding legal effect in international law. In that case,
Mr. Suarez-Medina's execution took place in Texas after the
issuance of requests for precautionary measures to the U.S.
government. This issue may take on increasing importance in the
United States in the wake of a decision in the U.S. Supreme Court in
October, 2002, in which two Justices dissented from denial of a
request for stay of execution solely because they believed the court
should address the issue of the binding nature of requests for
precautionary measures by the Commission.267
D. ACTIONS ON THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE ATTACKS OF
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
The Commission has responded in two distinct contexts to the
actions of the United States government in the wake of the tragic
events of September 11, 2001, when commercial aircrafts
265. Id. paras. 66-68.
266. Id. para. 66.
267. See Powell v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 31 (2002) (denying the application for
stay of execution).
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commandeered by terrorists targeted the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, and thousands of civilians lost their lives. First, in its
Annual Report for 2001, the Commission noted that the United
States took "exceptional measures" after the tragic events of
September 11, 2001. The Commission further concluded that
although the United States is a party to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, it "has not notified the UN Secretary
General in accordance with Article 4 of the Covenant of any resort
by it to emergency measures that might justify derogation from the
United States' obligations under that treaty." While the United States
has no reporting obligations under the American Convention because
it is not a party to that treaty, the Commission reiterated its oft-stated
conclusion that the United States is "subject to the fundamental
rights of individuals" contained in the OAS Charter and the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.268
Second, the Commission issued requests for precautionary
measures under Article 25 of its Rules of Procedure in two situations
where targeted groups sought the Commission's protection. The
Commission is no stranger to issues arising from terrorist attacks,
having dealt with terrorism on a regular basis for some time
throughout Latin America. The Commission, in fact, recently
released a major study on the topic of terrorism, entitled, "Report on
Terrorism and Human Rights." '269
In the first and most notable of the cases, the Commission issued a
request for precautionary measures to the United States on behalf of
detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. While the Commission's
requests for precautionary measures often do not attract either media
or academic attention, this request received widespread coverage.27
268. See Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
2001, OEA/Ser./LN/II. 114 doc. 5 rev. (2001), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2001 eng/TOC.htm.
269. OAS, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, Oct. 22, 2002,
OEA/Ser.LV/II. 116, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Terrorism/Eng/toc.htm
(last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
270. See, e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACommHR),
Washington, Decision of 12 March 2002, 23 HuM. RTs. L. J. 15 (2002) (asking the
U.S. government to clarify the legal status of the detainees); see also Dinah
Shelton, The Legal Status of the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Innovative
Elements in the Decision of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of
12 March 2002, 23 HUM. RTs. L.J. 13 (2002); Inter-American Commission on
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The petition was filed on behalf of a group of unnamed but clearly
identifiable individuals, all detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The
Center for Constitutional Rights, based in New York City,
coordinated the Guantanamo petition in collaboration with the Center
for Justice and International Law ("CEJIL") in Washington and a
small group of legal academics and students. The action was taken in
parallel with a federal petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241, filed on behalf of named detainees at Guantanamo.
The federal court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction
because "the military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is outside the
sovereign territory of the United States."27' The Commission suffers
no such lack of jurisdiction, as its powers reach to extraterritorial acts
of nations, particularly in the Americas.
The Commission's request to the United States seeks the
protection of precautionary measures under Article 25 of the
Commission's Rules of Procedure.272 Such requests are sought in
"serious and urgent cases" in order to maintain the status quo ante in
cases before the Commission, and to protect individuals who are the
subject of the litigation from "irreparable harm. 273 Normally, a
request for precautionary measures is sought contemporaneously
with the filing of a petition for review on the merits, but in this case,
the petitioners sought only precautionary measures. The Commission
was emphatic in its assertion that the U.S. government has an
obligation to follow their requests for such measures:
Human Rights (IACHR): Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures
(Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), 41 I.L.M. 532 (2002) [hereinafter
Precautionary Measures Decision] (requesting a competent tribunal to decide the
legal status of the Guantanamo Bay detainees after reviewing international
humanitarian law); United States (U.S.): Response of the United States to Request
for Precautionary Measures - Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba [Apr. 15, 2002]
41 I.L.M. 1015 (2002) [hereinafter U.S. Response to Request](responding to the
call for precautionary measures by stating that the IACHR has no jurisdiction to
apply international humanitarian law to the detainees, and that precautionary
measures are unnecessary because the legal status of the detainees is already clear).
271. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp.2d 55, 72 (D.C. 2002). This case is currently
pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See Habib v. Bush,
Case Nos. 02-5284 and 02-5288 (Consolidated).
272. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-Am. C.H.R, art. 25.
273. Id.
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The Commission notes preliminarily that its authority to receive and grant
requests for precautionary measures ... is, as with the practice of other
international decisional bodies, a well-established and necessary
component of the Commission's processes. Indeed, where such measures
are considered essential to preserving the Commission's very mandate
under the OAS Charter, the Commission has ruled that OAS members are
subject to an international legal obligation to comply with a request for
such measures.
274
The statement that a request for precautionary measures creates
"an international legal obligation to comply" is tantamount to an
assertion that the Commission's requests are binding on the countries
to which they are issued. The United States asserts in its pleadings to
the Commission, however, that, by virtue of its status as a non-State
party to the American Convention, the Commission lacks jurisdiction
over it, lacks jurisdiction to render any opinion that implicates the
application of international humanitarian law, lacks the power to
issue binding precautionary measures, and lacks the need to
intervene because the detainees' legal status is clear and they are
being well-treated.275 After submission of additional arguments from
the petitioners, the Commission issued an additional communication
to the United States on July 23, 2002, stating that "the Commission
remains of the view that it has the competence and the responsibility
to monitor the human rights situation of the detainees and in so doing
to look to and apply definitional standards and relevant rules of
international humanitarian law in interpreting and applying the
provisions of the Inter-American human rights instruments in times
of armed conflict. 276
The core of the Commission's ruling lies in its conclusion that the
executive branch of the U.S. government is not entitled to unilateral
and unreviewable designation of the Guantanamo detainees as
unlawful combatants under international humanitarian law. Such
274. Precautionary Measures Decision, supra note 270, at 532.
275. See U.S. Response to Request, supra note 270 (outlining the U.S. argument
against the Commission and its call for preliminary measures).
276. Letter from Ariel Dulitzky, In-charge of the Executive Secretariat, Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, to the Center for Constitutional Rights,
July 23, 2002 (containing text of a communication of the same date from the
Commission to the U.S. government).
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designation has the legal effect of leaving the detainees without any
legal protection for so long as armed conflict continues, and the
definitions of "armed conflict" and its termination are also left to the
executive branch's discretion. The detainees are entitled, the
Commission concludes, to access to a "competent tribunal" to
determine their legal status. The Commission's interpretation of
international humanitarian law is relatively new, but its interpretation
of its own norms by use of other treaties and treaty body decisions is
hardly unique in the Commission's history, nor in that of other
international tribunals. The Commission heard arguments in its
October 2002 regular session on the status of the detainees, and the
United States reiterated its legal position before the Commission.
The second petition for precautionary measures was filed in June
2002, on behalf of "INS detainees ordered deported or granted
voluntary departure." This group is composed of foreign individuals,
mostly men of Middle Eastern or Asian nationality, in the United
States. These people were taken into custody by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") for minor immigration rule violations
such as visa overstays and then kept in custody indefinitely, without
criminal charges or the opportunity to leave voluntarily for their
home countries. The INS holds closed hearings in these matters, does
not release the names of the individuals in question, and refuses to
provide public information on the conditions of their confinement or
their treatment in custody. The detainees have no effective legal
means of challenging their detention.
After repeated requests for information to the United States went
unanswered, the Commission issued a request for precautionary
measures on September 26, 2002.277 The request noted that the
government had failed to clarify or contradict the petitioners'
assertions that there is no basis under domestic or international law
for continued detention of these persons, that there is no public
information on the treatment of these detainees in custody, and that
the detainees have no basis for challenging their status. The request
for precautionary measures seeks to protect the detainees' "right to
personal liberty and security, their right to humane treatment, and
277. Letter from Ariel Dulitzky, In charge of the Executive Secretariat, Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, to Gay McDougall, International Human
Rights Law Group (Sept. 26, 2002).
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their right to resort to the courts for the protection of their legal
rights, by allowing impartial courts to determine whether the
detainees have been lawfully detained and whether they are in need
of protection. 278
E. CASES ARISING IN COLOMBIA'S INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT
The Commission's cases from Colombia address violence by para-
military forces and the military, and charge State responsibility for
carrying out, or collaborating in and covering up extrajudicial
executions and violations to physical integrity. As in other civil war
contexts, the State invokes military jurisdiction in connection with
the complaints against its members. The Commission reiterates in all
three cases the rule that military courts are unsuitable forums, and
therefore inadequate to provide judicial remedies for human rights
violations "allegedly committed by members of the armed forces or
with their collaboration or acquiescence. 279 Consequently, the
Commission ruled as inadmissible the allegations that domestic
remedies have not been exhausted, and it found violations of the
right to a fair trial and judicial protection.
The facts in these three cases all occur in the context of
Colombia's armed conflict. In the Riofrio Massacre Case, the
petitioners allege that the Colombian army "sponsored, permitted
and covered-up" the summary execution of thirteen persons by a
group of armed men, some of whom were dressed in military
uniforms, in a village in the Cauca region of Colombia.2 0 According
278. Id. at 2.
279. Riofrio Massacre v. Columbia, Case 11.654, Report No. 62/01, para. 28,
OEA/ser.L/V/II. 111 doc. Rev. at 758 (2000), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/200leng/chap.3b.htm (last visited Jan. 23,
2003); Leonel de Jesfis Isaza Echeverry. v. Colombia, Case 11.712, Report No.
64/01, Case 11.712, para. 22, OEA/ser.L/V/II. 111 doc. rev. at 797 (2000),
available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/Chapterlll/Merits/Colombia 11.712.ht
m (last visited Jan. 23, 2003); Carlos Manuel Prada Gonzalez and Evelio Antonio
Bolafio Castro v. Colombia, Case 11.710, Report No. 63/01, para. 26,
OEA/ser.L/V/II. 111 doc. rev. at 781 (2000), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/Chapterlll/Merits/Colombia 11.710.ht
m (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
280. Massacre, Case 11.654, para. 9.
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to testimonies, five hours after this armed incursion began, an army
anti-terrorist battalion entered the town and staged a mock military
engagement to cover up the murders and later released a statement
that army units had killed thirteen ELN guerrillas in a skirmish. The
proceedings in a military court concerning criminal responsibility
were still pending seven years later, without any final resolution.
The second case involved the killing of two militants belonging to
a political organization with ties to the ELN.2 81 The petitioners
asserted that Carlos Manuel Prada and Evelio Antonio Bolafios were
in Urabd to negotiate the demobilization of armed members of the
ELN, who had ,decided to join the political wing of that group.
Petitioners stated that the victims had made efforts to inform the
local army commanders of their presence and purpose in the area,
and that they believed that those efforts had been successful. The two
men were dressed in civilian clothes and carried only pistols for
protection. Finally, they asserted that one of the victims, when
confronted by a military patrol, removed his white shirt and waved it
as a sign of surrender. Physicat evidence supports the conclusion that
the two men were summarily executed.
In this case, the State rejected conditions of a friendly settlement
set by the petitioners. Petitioners proposed that the State
acknowledge its responsibility; refer the criminal investigation to the
regular justice system; establish a committee to ensure reparations,
including "political reparations" to the CRS (Corriente de
Renovaci6n Socialista); restore the historical memory of the victims;
create strategies to prevent future violations of this type; and put in
place protective measures for surviving family members and
witnesses to the events. The issue of military jurisdiction was the
sticking point. Despite the civilian Attorney General's finding that
members of the military were "participants in the events leading to
the death of the presumed victims, ' '282 and that there was
corroborative evidence of petitioners' version of events, the State
said its hands were tied by a judicial decision ordering the case to be
heard in the military jurisdiction. The military court, in turn, ruled
that the deaths had occurred in combat during military operations.
281. Gonzalez and Castro, Case 11.710.
282. Id. para. 15.
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The State asserted that without a conviction, it could not accept
international responsibility.
The third case concerned the execution of one person and assaults
on his family members.283 Members of an army battalion entered the
victim's home, shot him as he attempted to get up from a chair, and
then fired a fatal shot as he tried to crawl away. The victim's elderly
mother and four-year old daughter were wounded by a grenade
thrown into the house as soldiers left the location. This case was also
referred to a military court, which, the State maintained, should not
be ruled ineffective or unfair as a general matter. The State also
asked that administrative proceedings and orders disciplining some
of those accused be taken into account in the Commission's
assessment of the adequacy of the remedy. After seven years of
proceedings, the military court ruled that the accused members of the
military acted in justifiable self-defense.
In all three cases, there are disputed facts with diametrically
opposing versions. Although civilian investigations support the
petitioners' version of events, the military courts discounted them.
Again, in all three cases the Commission analyzed the evidence and
the investigative proceedings and found that, for purposes of
exhaustion of remedies, the military court option is inadequate.
Concerning the underlying violations, the Commission found that
with regard to the actions of the military and the paramilitary forces,
the State was responsible for having perpetrated the crimes. Based on
a previous study of the human rights situation in Colombia,284 the
Commission applied a presumption of State responsibility for
paramilitary actions when members of paramilitary groups and the
army carry out joint operations with the knowledge of superior
officers, under the theory that in those circumstances, the
paramilitaries are State agents.
The Commission also repeats its analysis of State responsibility
for the denial of due process rights and the right to an effective
remedy under Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention. Citing the Court's
283. Echeverry, Case 11.712.
284. See Third Report on Human Rights in Colombia, OEA/ser.LiV/II. 102 doc.
9 rev. 1 (1999) (reviewing the status of human rights in Columbia), available at
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Colom99en/table%20of/2Ocontents.htm (last
visited Jan. 23, 2003).
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judgment on the merits in Durand y Ugarte, the definitions of due
process and effective judicial remedies are tied to the legitimacy of
the process and its result. "A norm is meant to have an effect and
should not be interpreted in such a way as to negate its effect or lead
to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 285 The
Commission recalls the unreasonable delays in resolving the cases
(up to seven years), as well as its prior determinations that military
jurisdiction is an executive branch institution unrelated to the
judiciary and without professional career judges. Such tribunals have
failed to perform the prosecutorial function in a manner appropriate
to the accusatory role.286 These characteristics mark military courts as
prima facie partial and lacking in independence. 287
These inherent failings also mean that the military tribunals should
not be allowed to adjudge civilians, or crimes against them. The
Commission stated:
Military penal justice system shall have a restrictive and exceptional
scope and shall lead to the protection of special juridical interests, related
to the function assigned by law to the military forces. Consequently,
civilians must be excluded from military jurisdiction, and only the
military shall be judged for the commission of crimes or offenses that by
their own nature, attempt against legally protected interests of military
order.28
8
The Commission noted that the Colombian Constitutional Court
concurred with this analysis when it ruled that in serious crimes any
link between the charged offense and the scope of military functions
is dissolved, requiring the case to be heard in the civilian criminal
courts. The Commission called on the State to enforce that judgment.
F. CASES REFLECTING THE CONTINUING CONSEQUENCES OF
GUATEMALA'S INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT
The Commission's 2000 Annual Report includes several cases
from Guatemala concerning violations arising from the actions of
285. Echeverry, Case 11.712, para. 24.
286. Ana, Beatriz, and Cecilia Gonzalez Perez, Case 11.565, para. 81.
287. Id.
288. Gonzalez and Castro, Case 11.710, para. 41.
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State sponsored paramilitary groups during the internal armed
conflict in Guatemala. Of particular note is the discussion in Remigio
Domingo Morales, et. al. v. Guatemala,289 on the operation of the
Civil Defense Patrols ("Patrullas de Auto Defensa Civil," or
"PACs"), which were employed by the military as part of its counter-
insurgency strategy. The facts relate to the extra-judicial execution of
fifteen persons and the attempted execution of seven others, all of
whom had expressed their opposition to the patrols. Some of the
victims had previously served on the patrols and wished to
discontinue their service, while others refused to join. As a result of
that opposition, the military threatened the victims, and attempts
were made on all their lives. Of the fifteen murders and seven
attempted murders, all remain unpunished nine years after the fact.
All of the incidents took place between 1990 and 1993, many
years after the military defeated the guerrilla forces, and only a few
years before the Peace Accords put a formal end to the war in 1996.
In this respect, it is disturbing to note that the Commission still found
it necessary, in 2001, to recommend that the Guatemalan State
"effectively avoid the resurgence and reorganization of the Civil
Self-Defense Patrols." The United Nations Verification Mission in
Guatemala (MINUGUA), which was responsible for verifying
compliance with the peace accords, had similar misgivings. In its
latest human rights report covering the period ending in June 2002,
the Mission observed that:
Many former CVDC290 members and former Military Commissioners
have preserved leadership roles in municipal governments, development
289. Cases: 10.626 Remigio Domingo Morales and Rafael Sanchez; 10.627
Pedro Tau Cac; 11.198(A) Jose Maria Ixcaya Pixtay et. al.; 10.799 Catalino
Chochoy, Jose Corino Thesen and Abelino Baycaj; 10.751 Juan Galicia
Hernindez, Andres Abelino Galicia Gutierrez and Orlando Adelso Galicia
Gutierrez; and 10.901 Antulio Delgado, Report No. 59/01, OEA/ser.L/V/II.111
doc. 20 rev. at 953 (2000), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/Chapterlll/Merits/Guatemala10.626.ht
m (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
290. Comites Voluntarios de Defensa Civil (Voluntary Civilian Defense
Committees). The formation of these committees was initiated by the military in
the early 1980s, and they were informally designated as PACs or Patrullas de
Autodefensa Civil (Civilian Self-Defense Patrols). In 1983, a decree was issued by
the then de facto military government, baptizing them as CVDC's and officially
recognizing their existence.
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councils, local security councils, or as auxiliary mayors in the
communities where they committed serious crimes during the conflict.
They often exercise leadership in authoritarian ways, using intimidation to
resolve disputes in their favour, and preying on fears that they could resort
to violence, as in the past. These practices and their continuing
participation in "social intelligence" activities of the Army's Division for
Civilian Affairs seem to suggest ongoing ties to the military and the need
for further change.
291
In the early 1980's, the military used intimidation and violence to
force communities to form PACs. The military created, trained, and
supervised these local patrols. The patrollers perpetrated threats and
violence, provided information to local army commanders, and
engaged in detentions. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
found the PACs responsible for the kidnapping and death of a U.S
citizen. Denunciation by a patroller was a death sentence, and refusal
to participate in the patrols was taken as an admission of being part
of, or sympathetic to, the guerrillas. Patrollers were also used as
human shields and compelled to participate in executions and acts of
torture against their neighbors. In this respect, patrollers were both
victims and perpetrators of human rights violations.
The Commission cites to evidence from Guatemala's Historical
Clarification Commission Report292  ("CEH Report"), the
Archdiocese Recuperation of Historical Memory Report ("ODAHG
Report"), the reports of the Independent Expert on Human Rights in
Guatemala, Guatemala's Human Rights Ombudsman, and the
Commission's own prior reports on Guatemala. The information
contained in those reports gave a rich context for understanding how
the PACs operated, and demonstrated that they committed systematic
human rights violations with the support and acquiescence of the
State. Indications of PAC participation in systematic violence
included CEH conclusions that the PACs were responsible for
twenty-one percent of extra-judicial executions committed during the
war, some of which were carried out by the PACs themselves, while
291. Thirteenth Report of Human Rights, MINUGUA, para. 51., available at
http://www.minugua.guate.net (last visited Mar. 1, 2003).
292. Guatemala Memory of Silence, (Feb. 2002), available at
http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/gmds-pdf/index.html (last visited Nov. 23,
2002).
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others were committed in conjunction with military commissioners
or regular army forces. During 1982 and 1983, approximately eighty
percent of the rural male population was organized into PACs. Citing
the CEH Report, 93 the Commission concluded that "the main
purpose of the PAC was to marshal the civil populace against the
guerrilla movements and to gain physical and psychological control
over the population."
The Commission also cited these reports to demonstrate the justice
system's ineffectiveness and general inoperability during the period
in question, particularly with regard to human rights violations. As a
consequence, the Commission rejected the government's objection
on admissibility grounds for failure to ever file a criminal complaint.
The Commission noted the "atmosphere of impunity," continuing
threats, and the failure to resolve any of these cases of attempted or
completed extrajudicial executions nine years after the perpetrations,
as additional indicia of the inability to provide an adequate remedy.
The Commission held against the State for violations of the rights
to life, liberty, humane treatment, respect for physical integrity, due
process, lack of a judicial remedy, and the general obligation to
respect and ensure these rights under the Convention. The
Commission also found violations under the Inter-American
Convention against Torture and reiterated its recommendations that
the State investigate and punish those responsible, provide
reparations to victims and their families, and take effective measures
to prevent a resurgence of the PACs. Finally, the Commission urged
Guatemala to promote and implement the principles contained in the
U.N. Declaration on the right and responsibility of individuals,
groups, and institutions to promote and protect universally
293. Interestingly, both the Commission and the Court have referred to the CEH
Report as an authoritative source of information on Guatemala, despite the
limitation in the CEH's mandate that it have no judicial effect. That restriction has
been meaningless in reality because an agreement cannot limit the power of an
independent judge to determine what evidence in that report is relevant and how to
weigh it. Nevertheless, references in Guatemalan national legislation to the terms
of the CEH's mandate could arguably have that effect, at least in the Guatemalan
courts. An analysis of the consistency of such a requirement with due process
obligations under international law would make for an interesting study. In any
event, the report is comprised of some hearsay evidence, given that the CEH
maintained the anonymity of its sources. This means that it is best used for
establishing patterns of action and general tendencies.
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recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. The State's
response to the recommendations on the initial Article 50 report
added no new elements in response to the documented violations.
A recently admitted case addressing the issue of the PACs
demonstrates the State's ambivalence in dealing with rights
violations from the civil war period. Guatemala continues to deny its
primary responsibility for the actions of these paramilitary
organizations. In Toms Lares Cipriano v. Guatemala,94 the State
accepted its international responsibility by omission for its failure to
respect and guarantee the rights of the victim (Article 1(1)), and it
conceded that the events as described by the petitioner had, in fact,
occurred. A friendly settlement has not materialized, despite the
expressed will of the petitioners. It is unclear from the record
whether Guatemala is indeed willing to reach such an agreement.
The State has argued that domestic remedies have not been
exhausted, and that the State is willing to pursue the investigation
and prosecution of those responsible. In this regard, the State seems
to confuse the issue of political will with the effective
implementation of judicial or other remedies for rights violations.
Government is not based solely on good faith, but must rely on
functioning institutions capable of taking legitimate and credible
actions to respect and guarantee rights.
In Tomas Lares Cipriano, the victim publicly refused in 1993 to
continue to participate in the so-called "Voluntary Civilian Defense
Committees," ("CVDC") citing provisions of the Guatemalan
Constitution on freedom of association. Other members of his
community, including members of a local human rights group, also
protested. Those who renounced their participation for the first time
complained of having already given thirteen years of service
patrolling. Although the State had asserted their participation was not
obligatory, in practice, it was compelled under threat of violence and
death. Just as in the Remegio Morales case, Mr. Lares suffered death
threats for his protest prior to being assassinated. As of the date of
the admissibility report in February 2002, one person was sentenced
294. Case 11.171, Informe No. 13/02, (2002), available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002sp/guatemala. 11171.htm (last visited Nov. 23,
2000).
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for the crime, and four arrest warrants were pending for nine years
against the remaining accused.
Two other cases from Guatemala, Ileana del Rosario Solares
Castillo, et. al. v. Guatemala,295 and Oscar Manuel Gramajo Lopez v.
Guatemala,296 document the unresolved instances of four forced
disappearances of three women and one young man, which occurred
in Guatemala's capital city in 1983. The State security forces
perpetrated the disappearances.
Both cases reflect the same ambivalence by the government
towards these past crimes as in the previous cases discussed above.
The State reported that it would agree to follow the Commission's
previous recommendations to investigate and prosecute the crimes,
and that it would provide reparations. However, the State then
proceeded to request that the Commission provide the identity and
addresses of the victim's family members. The Commission's
response was terse and direct: "The Commission believes that the
fact that more than 17 years after the events described herein the
State still lacks even the most basic information about the identity
and whereabouts of the victims' families reinforces all the
Commission's conclusions in this report. 297
The Commission found violations of the victims' right to life,
humane treatment, personal liberty, and fair trial and judicial
protection. There is no additional information, to date, on their fate.
G. CASES FROM PERU
The case of Extra-Judicial Executions and Forced
Disappearances298 combines 120 cases involving victims of the
295. Case 9111, Report No. 60/01, OEA/ser.L/V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. at 903
(2000), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/Chapterll/Merits/Guatemala9111 .htm
(last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
296. Case 9207, Report No. 58/01, OEA/ser.L/V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. at 918
(2000), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/Chapterlll/Merits/Guatemala.9207.ht
m (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
297. Castillo, et al., Case 9111, para. 49.
298. Extrajudicial Executions and Forced Disappearances v. Peru, Case 10.247
et al., Report No. 101/01, OEA/ser.L/V/1I.114 doc. 5 rev. (2001), available at
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Fujimori regime into a single case from Peru. The individual cases,
initiated by six different Peruvian human rights organizations, were
joined for common disposition. The pattern of repressive
counterinsurgency tactics endorsed by the former Peruvian
government, including forced disappearances, had been
acknowledged in previous Commission reports. 299 The Commission
previously found that a pattern of forced disappearances existed in
Peru between 1989 and 1993. The circumstances of the victims in
this case further corroborated this pattern, and the decision expanded
the time period to cover the years between 1984 and 1989.310
The Commission sustained all of the violations alleged. Given the
disposition of the new government to assume State responsibility for
such cases, the remaining issue is the scope of that responsibility.
The large number of victims in this case, the larger number of
affected family members, and the impending recommendations of
Peru's national Truth Commission on reparations for all of those
affected by violations during the Fujimori regime may result in
significant disbursements over a short period of time. The extent of
these monetary reparations would be particularly troubling for the
new Peruvian government facing serious economic challenges.
Moreover, the court system may find it difficult to try and punish
perpetrators in each of the thousands of cases of executions, forced
disappearance, and torture that the Truth Commission may register.
The conversation between Peru and the Commission about the
manner of compliance with the recommendations in this case gives a
glimpse as to how this debate will proceed. For the 120 victims in the
case under discussion, the Commission recommended that Peru:
1. Void any judicial decision, internal measure, legislative or
otherwise, that tends to impede the investigation, prosecution, and
punishment of the persons responsible for the summary executions
http://www.oas.org/cidh/annualrep/200leng/Peru10247.htm (last visited Jan. 23,
2003).
299. See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru (1993) (discussing the
Commission's identifications of human rights problems in Peru), available at
http://www.iachr.org/countryrep/93 PeruS&E/index.peru.htm (last visited Jan. 23,
2003).
300. Extrajudicial Executions and Forced Disappearances, Case 10.247 et al.,
para. 179.
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and forced disappearance of the victims indicated at paragraph
252.... [T]he State should also repeal Laws N' 26,479 and 26,492;
2. Carry out a complete, impartial, and effective investigation to
determine the circumstances of the extrajudicial executions and
forced disappearances of the victims and to punish the persons
responsible, pursuant to Peruvian legislation;
3. Adopt the measures necessary for the victims' families to
receive adequate and timely compensation for the violations
established herein; and
4. Accede to the Inter-American Convention on Forced
Disappearance of Persons.301
The State indicated that the cases included in the Commission's
report would be sent for investigation to the Truth Commission, and
that proposals for full reparations for victims and their family
members would be prepared on the basis of those investigations,
"consistent with the third recommendation.""3 2 Peru's stated idea "is
to deal in a comprehensive matter with this dimension of the human
rights violations.""3 3
This approach raises interesting issues about the scope of the right
to reparations and about the appropriate process for reaching
determinations on reparations. In a case from Chile discussed in this
article,30 4 the Commission indicated that the failure to criminally
investigate and punish human rights violators precluded the victim's
right to a civil remedy for reparations. This was true, the
Commission stated, despite the fact that the State had already
provided reparations through its truth commission process. In these
301. Id. para. 253. Regarding the fourth recommendation, Peru reports that it
signed the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons on
January 8, 2001, and that ratification is pending in the Peruvian Congress. See
Inter-Am. C.H.R, Press Release, No. 4/01 para. 19 (Mar. 9, 2001), available at
http://www.cidh.org/comunicados/english/2001/press4-O1.htm (last visited Nov.
19, 2002).
302. Extra-Judicial Executions and Forced Disappearances, Case 10.247 et al.
para. 255.
303. Id.
304. See Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988) (addressing reparations), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecing/serie-c_4_ing.doc (last visited Nov. 22, 2002).
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circumstances, victims of human rights abuses may still test the
sufficiency of reparations awards under standards different from
those developed by the Truth Commission because existing laws
allow for civil liability of the State for the actions of its agents.
As to the second recommendation concerning investigation,
prosecution, and punishment, the Peruvian State considered that an
initial step in addressing the recommendation was to transfer the
cases to the Truth Commission. °5 In addition, the Public Defender
(Human Rights Ombudsman) has launched an investigation into the
disappearance of persons in Peru from 1980 to 1996, which is a
further indication of Peru's efforts to fulfill the recommendations of
the Commission.30 6 Also in this regard, the Peruvian government
reports that, "the Executive Branch has transmitted [the] Report...
to the Ministries of Defense and the Interior, as well as the Judicial
Branch and the Attorney General's Office, so that they may take
steps consistent with their constitutional and legal responsibilities.""3 7
As previous decisions of the Commission have demonstrated,
investigations conducted by a truth commission are inadequate to
comply with the State's obligation to provide a judicial remedy and
fair trial for serious human rights violations under the Convention.
The test is whether the State "use[s] the means at its disposal to carry
out a serious investigation.., to identify those responsible, to
impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate
compensation. 30 8 Consequently, the Commission will evaluate those
efforts of the Peruvian government as it supervises compliance with
its recommendations.
305. Extra-Judicial Executions and Forced Disappearances, Case 10.247 et al.,
para. 255.
306. Id. This is a reference to the human rights ombudsperson in Peru, who is
called the Defensor del Pueblo. The distinction is important, as there is also a state
agency called the Public Defender that provides legal representation to persons
who cannot afford counsel.
307. Id.
308. Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, para. 174, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.C) No. 4 (1988), available at
http://www.dal.ca/-wwwlaw/kindred.intllaw/velasquezrodriguezcase.htm (last
visited Jan. 24, 2003).
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The Peruvian government, however, referred only to
recommendations 2, 3, and 4, and failed to make any representations
with regard to the repeal of the amnesty laws. Nevertheless, the later
decision by the Inter-American Court in the Barrios Altos Case319
would seem to make such action imperative.
In Pedro Pablo Lopez, et al. v. Peru310 and Yone Cruz Ocalio,311
the Commission sustained a violation of Article 3 (right to juridical
personality) of the American Convention, based on the argument that
"the forced disappearance of persons constitutes the negation of their
very existence as human beings recognized as persons before the
law. '3 2 The Court later rejected this conclusion in the Bamaca-
Velasquez Judgment.3 3 Nevertheless, in a concurring opinion, Judge
Roux Rengifo urged the further exploration of the definition of
Article 3 rights.31 4
H. OTHER REPORTED CASES
Chile, yet again, provides us with a new twist on the line of cases
examining amnesty provisions for human rights abuses. One issue
309. Barrios Altos Case, Interpretation of the Judgment on the Merits (Art. 67
American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of Sept. 3, 2001, Inter-Am Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 83 (2001), available at
http://www 1 .umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/83-ing.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
310. Case 11.031, Report No.111/00, OEA/ser.L/V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. at 1129
(2000), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/ChapterIII/Merits/Peru 11.031 .htm
(last visited Jan. 24, 2003).
311. Case 11.099, Report No.112/00, OEA/ser.L/V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. at 1154
(2000), available at.
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/Chapterlll/Merits/Peru 11.099.htm
(last visited Jan. 24, 2003).
312. Pedro Pablo Lopez, et al., Case 11.031, para. 58; Yone Cruz Ocalio, Case
11.099, para. 45 (citing Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988,
para. 174, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.C) No. 4 (1988)).
313. Bamaca Velasquez Case, Judgment of Nov. 25, 2000, Inter-Am Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 70 (2000), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/70-
ing.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
314. Bamaca Velasquez Case, Separate Opinion of Judge de Roux Rengifo,
Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 70 (2000), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecing/VotodeRouxSerie c_70_ing.doc (last visited
Jan. 23, 2003).
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left unanswered by the Inter-American Court in the Barrios Altos
Case is squarely presented in this new challenge to the 1978 amnesty
law in Chile. In the case of the forced disappearance of Samuel
Alfonso Cataldn Lincoleo, 1 5 the petitioners confront the legitimacy
of the amnesty as part of a political pact intended to smooth the
transition from the military dictatorship to democratic rule in 1990.
This decision, issued one month before the Court's Barrios Altos
decision, concurs in the Court's logic by declaring that amnesties and
statutes of limitations that purport to shield human rights abusers
from prosecution and punishment are inconsistent with the American
Convention. The Commission goes even further, declaring
inadmissible any defense that would permit the continued application
of the amnesty law as the result of a political pact. Based on that
finding, the Commission found a violation of Article 2 of the
American Convention, which obligates the State to "adapt its
domestic laws to the provisions of the international instrument."3 6
The facts involved efforts by the victim's family members to
pursue a criminal investigation and prosecution of the disappearance.
Those efforts were truncated when the Supreme Court upheld a
lower court decision barring the criminal action. The State presented
its defense based on two circumstances. First, the State pointed to the
fact that the Chilean National Truth and Reconciliation Commission
had officially acknowledged State responsibility for thousands of
deaths and disappearances during the military regime, the present
case included, and that the Truth Commission had provided
meaningful material and non-material reparations to the surviving
family members. Second, the State asserted that the executive branch
had the political will to prosecute the human rights abusers, as
evidenced by repeated public statements by high-level officials in
two successive democratic governments. The Supreme Court argued
that the State could not be held responsible for the actions of an
independent judiciary that continued to apply the amnesty law.
315. Samuel Alfonso Cataldn Lincoleo v. Chile, Case 11.771, Report No.61/01,
OEA/ser.L/V/I1. 111 doe. 20 rev. at 818 (2000), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/ChapterIl/Merits/Chile 11.77 l.htm
(last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
316. Id. para. 3.
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The Commission countered that, from the perspective of
international law, the State is one entity for the purposes of
complying with its responsibility for treaty obligations. It cited
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which
provides that States Parties may not invoke provisions of their
domestic laws as a justification for non-compliance with the terms of
a treaty.31 7 Moreover, the Commission noted that the amnesty law,
passed by the defacto government of Augusto Pinochet, continued to
be applied to protect the planners and perpetrators of the abuses in
both Chile and other countries. This alluded to the arguments of the
Chilean foreign ministry in opposition to Great Britain's extradition
request for General Pinochet. Clearly, the reference to the amnesty as
the product of a defacto government that has also benefited from the
law's provisions, both before and after the democratic transition,
implied that indeed this may be a self-amnesty of the kind the Court
rejected in Barrios Altos.
Nevertheless, the Commission's conclusions also rejected the
"political pact" defense of amnesties for violations of Articles 1(1)
and 2 of the American Convention when it stated that the Truth
Commission's official acknowledgment of State responsibility and
the reparations provided fall short of what is required. In order for
the State to comply with its duty "to ensure the full and free exercise
of those rights," '318 the remedy must include an effective investigation
into the identity of the perpetrators, their prosecution and
punishment, and appropriate reparations. In this regard, the
Commission Cited Pedro Nikken, a former President of the Court:
The establishment of a truth commission is a plausible means, within a
political negotiation to reach peace in an armed conflict, as a first step and
perhaps the most tangible contribution that can be made within that
scenario to combat impunity ... [Nonetheless,] the establishment of the
truth should not inhibit the judicial organs from judging and punishing the
persons responsible, but outside the context of a political negotiation.
319
317. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 29,
1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm#abstract (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
318. SamuelAlfonso Catahn Lincoleo, Case 11.771, para. 77.
319. Id. para. 82 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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The Commission also cites the Chilean National Truth
Commission's report, which also concluded that prosecutions are a
necessary element of reconciliation and the prevention of future
violations.32 °
In X and Z v. Argentina,32' the Commission applied the fair trial
and effective recourse guarantees of the American Convention to a
transnational child-custody case, in which the Argentinean court
applied the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction. The Commission found that the Hague Convention
provided sufficient due process protections, and that the domestic
court appropriately applied the Convention. It concluded that the
State did not violate the Convention in this case.
In Marcelino Henriquez et. al. v. Argentina,322 the Commission
fashioned a test to analyze whether the application of a law to the
circumstances of a particular case results in discrimination
inconsistent with Convention protections. 23 The test asks whether
there is a reasonable justification for the distinction in treatment, and
if so, whether the means employed are reasonably proportional to the
end sought. This test is similar to the analysis in U.S. jurisprudence
interpreting the U.S. Constitution's equal protection clause. One
important difference in the Commission's analysis is that it does not
provide for differing levels of scrutiny, depending on the rights
affected.
The law challenged involved a provision in domestic law by which
persons detained on orders of the executive during the military
dictatorship in Argentina would receive reparations for that arbitrary
act. The petitioner claimed that he was discriminated because he was
320. Id. para. 83.
321. Case 11.676, Report No.71/00, OEA/ser.L/V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. at 582
(2000), available at
http://www.oas.org/cidh/annualrep/2000eng/Chapterlll/Merits/Argentina 11.676.ht
m (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
322. Case 11.784, Report No.73/00, OEA/ser.L/V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. at 603
(2000), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2OOOeng/Chapterlil/Merits/Argentinal 1.784.ht
m (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
323. See American Convention, supra note 13, art. 24 (stating that all persons
are equal before the law and that they are entitled to equal protection of the law
without discrimination).
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not indemnified for all of the time he spent in jail. The Commission
found reasonable and proportional a distinction in the calculation of
monetary awards for damages where the factual circumstances
differed, and that the petitioners had not been treated differently than
others in their same circumstances. The distinction rested on whether
the detention was the result of an executive order, which the State
argued was deemed prima facie illegitimate, or the result of a judicial
order, which the State argued was not prima facie illegitimate.
The petitioner had also challenged this distinction based on the
fact that the law, as applied, presented an obstacle to the State's
compliance with its international obligation to provide reparations
for human rights violations. The Commission noted that the law
provided an administrative procedure to which the victim was free to
adhere, and that the right to a judicial remedy was not precluded by
the existence of an alternative option for disbursing reparations. The
Commission finally concluded that the State had not violated the
American Convention.
I. FRIENDLY SETTLEMENTS
Article 41 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure contemplates
friendly settlement procedures.324 The parties can adopt this kind of
resolution at any point in the proceedings, but all the parties must
consent. The Commission may determine that the case is not
susceptible to a settlement, notify the parties of that action, and in the
absence of an agreement to the contrary, the case will resume
processing. In the event of a settlement, the Commission is required
to verify the consent of the victim or successors, and all of the
agreements must be based on respect for the rights recognized in the
American Declaration, the American Convention, "and other
applicable instruments. 325
Friendly settlements offer the victim or her family members an
opportunity to receive reparations and dispense with the full
litigation of the case before the Commission and the Court. The
terms of these agreements vary. Foregoing litigation may mean that
324. See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-Am. C.H.R., art 41 (excluding the
contemplation of friendly settlement procedures).
325. Id. art. 41(5).
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there will be no public acceptance of international responsibility.
This can occur when a State precludes such a finding by anticipating
the required response and taking prompt corrective action. In other
cases, the State may only accept institutional responsibility regarding
its failure to investigate and punish the underlying violation, but be
unwilling to concede that the State was directly responsible for
perpetrating that act. In those cases where a condition of the
settlement is the identification, prosecution, and punishment of the
individuals criminally responsible for the facts constituting the
violation, the Commission is faced with the task of measuring
compliance with that commitment. In analyzing the friendly
settlement decisions, all these circumstances should be taken into
account.
In Maria Merciadri de Morini v. Argentina,326 the petitioner
alleged violations of due process and equal protection, the right to
participate in government, and the right to a judicial remedy. The
published friendly settlement agreement dispenses altogether with a
debate on international responsibility. The settlement provided for
the promulgation of a law effectively enforcing a quota on women's
participation in proposed party tickets for national elections. The
petitioner had disputed the prior rules of implementation, which, she
asserted, undermined the purpose behind requiring that thirty percent
of candidates for national election from each party be women.
The detailed compromise, drafted as legislation and promulgated
by then-President Fernando de la Rua, closed gaps that effectively
frustrated the opportunity for the candidacy quotas to be translated
into a minimum number of sitting women politicians. The State did
not dispute the legitimacy of the quota in this case, and the only
substantive input on the issue of women's rights was the observation
that "achieving the free and full participation of women in political
life is a priority for our hemisphere. '327 A recently admitted case
326. Case 11.307, Report No. 103/01, OEA/ser./L/V/I1. 114 doc. 5 rev. (2001),
available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2001eng/argentina11307.htm (last
visited Jan. 23, 2003).
327. Id. para. 16.
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from Peru alleged a similar challenge to rules implementing
affirmative action quotas for women in that country.32
Ecuador has by far the largest number of friendly settlement
agreements during the relevant period from 2000 to 2002. This is a
reflection of the stated policy of that country's Attorney General to
initiate "conversations with all persons who have been victims of
human rights violations, aimed at reaching friendly settlement
agreements to provide reparations for the damages caused. 3 29 The
cases deal primarily with abuses by police and other security forces,
including arbitrary or illegal arrest, torture, disappearance, and extra-
judicial executions. The settlements provide for compensation for
material, moral and consequential damages, and require the State to
make efforts to investigate and punish those responsible. This last
commitment is framed in the following terms:
The Ecuadorian State pledges to bring civil and criminal proceedings and
pursue administrative sanctions against those persons who are alleged to
have participated in the violation in the performance of State functions or
under the color of public authority.
The Office of the Attorney General pledges to encourage the State
Attorney General, the competent judicial organs, and public agencies or
private institutions to contribute legal evidence to determine the liability
of those persons.
330
328. Janet Espinoza Feria et. al. v. Peru, Case 12.404, Report No 51/02 (2002),
available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002sp/perul2404.htm (last visited
Jan. 23, 2003).
329. See, e.g., Edison Patricio Quishpe Alcivar v. Ecuador, Case 11.421, Report
93/00, para. 7(l), OEA/ser.L/V/I1. 111 doc. 20 rev. at 503 (2000), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/Chapterlll/Friendly/Ecuadorl 1.421 .ht
m (last visited Jan. 24, 2003); Byron Roberto Canaveral v. Ecuador, Case 11.439,
Report No. 94/00, para. 8(I), OEA/ser.L/V/II. 111 doc. 20 rev. at 509 (2000),
available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/Chapterlll/Friendly/Ecuadorl 1.439.ht
m (last visited Jan. 24, 2003); Manuel Inocencio Lalvay Guaman v. Ecuador, Case
11.466, Report No. 96/00, para. 13(I), OEA/ser.L/V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. at 519
(2000) (citing commonly used text for the Background section of friendly
settlement agreements), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/Chapterlll/Friendly/Ecuadorl 1.466.ht
m (last visited Jan. 24, 2003).
330. See Edison Patricio Quishpe Alcivar, Case 11.421, para. 7(V); Byron
Roberto Canaveral, Case 11.439, para. 8(V); Manuel Inocencio Lalvay Guaman,
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The Commission is monitoring compliance with the terms of these
settlements.
J. OTHER RECENTLY ADMITTED CASES
Cases admitted during the period covered by this report comprise
an interesting array of social issues ranging from questions of State
obligations towards HIV-positive persons, pensioners and their social
security benefits, indigenous peoples, and the application of
Agreement 169 of the International Labor Organization on
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples to rights concerning natural resources
on traditional lands. The Commission is examining immigration and
nationality rights, freedom of expression for journalists and authors,
political rights involving election participation, labor rights, the
violation of the lawyer-client privilege, and the scope of a State's
obligation to protect all these rights.
However, the customary complaints of torture, inhumane
treatment based on poor prison conditions, violations by security
forces and paramilitary death squads with State collaboration or
acquiescence, disappearances, extra-judicial executions, arbitrary
detentions, and due process violations will also continue to be the
subject of Commission decisions in future reports. The countries
affected are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.
Case 11.466, para. 13(V) (quoting commonly used text for the section of friendly
settlement agreements addressing "Punishment of the Persons Responsible").
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